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Abstract 
 
 This dissertation examines the role of institutional features on fiscal outcomes: the level of 
hidden liabilities, credit spreads, and official government debt. We construct a country panel dataset and 
use quantile regression and error correction models for empirical analysis: quantile regression to verify 
how variables play different roles in explaining the level of hidden debt and credit spreads at each 
percentile of the conditional distribution and error correction model to investigate the role of institutional 
features on the long-term equilibrium level of government debt.  
In Chapter 1, we discuss the roles of credibility and fiscal discipline on the level of government 
debt. Our findings are as follows: First, the bond issuance ceiling expands as a country builds up 
credibility because higher credibility reduces the concerns over repudiation of existing debt. Governments 
with weak policymaking institutions may want to fully utilize this favorable funding condition and end up 
with a relatively high level of government debt. Next, once a government reaches a sufficiently high level 
of credibility, the optimal choice of government debt becomes smaller because stronger fiscal institutions 
induce the government to borrow less.  
In Chapter 2, we study which factors determine the government’s tendency to resort to off-budget 
activities. First, factors that make public borrowing difficult such as larger official debt and higher 
borrowing cost induce politicians to resort to hiding debt. Second, certain institutional characteristics such 
as strong credibility and transparency in the government sector reduce the willingness of politicians to 
arrange hidden expenditures because it becomes more costly to hide debt. Third, the transition from the 
cash-based accounting method to the accrual-based one helps reduce hidden debt, but countries that are 
not credible may run hidden debt even under the accrual-based system. 
In Chapter 3, we investigate the determinants of sovereign bond credit spreads in emerging 
market countries. First, the increases in government debt lead to a widening of the spreads because a 
higher debt level raises the concerns over default on sovereign debt. Second, we find that the market 
participants consider the role of fiscal institutions when pricing the risk premia of sovereign bonds. Better 
fiscal institutions tend to mitigate the widening of credit spreads from increases in debt. Furthermore, the 
negative impact of additional borrowing on spreads will be negligible if a country has good fiscal 
institutions. Lastly, the socio-political characteristics of a country such as contract reliability and 
observance of law also play important roles in determining the level of sovereign bond spreads. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The Determinants of Public Debt:  
Role of Fiscal Discipline and Political Institution 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This study analyzes the determinants of public debt and offers an explanation for the variation of 
public debt among countries. Traditional government debt theory explains that governments issue 
sovereign bonds to smooth the consumption path. If government expenditures have stochastic streams, then 
it is optimal for the government to maximize the utility of household issues or pay back government bonds 
to smooth consumption (Barro, 1979). However, it is difficult to explain why countries respond to 
expenditure shock in different ways that lead to the huge cross-country variation in the level of debt 
according to the traditional view. Even the debt levels among European countries that may have 
experienced similar expenditure shock turn out to be quite different (Alesina and Perotti, 1994). It raises 
the question of why do we observe the large debt in certain countries but not in others, and what factors 
drive this different fiscal outcome.  
We also need to think about how the public debt is seen by the financial market participants. One 
may believe that carrying high levels of public debt is considered as a potential source of macroeconomic 
instability. Large accumulations of public debt makes the country more vulnerable to external shocks and 
increases the default risk on existing debt. However, alternatively, one may view those high debt levels as a 
sign of creditworthiness and the confidence of capital markets in the sustainability of fiscal policies. Once a 
country is considered as credible in repaying its debt, international lenders may want to loan out money to 
this country. Under this favorable funding condition, some countries decide to fully utilize this position 
and other countries may keep fiscal discipline.  We suspect that not only economic factors but also 
politico-institutional factors can play crucial roles in understanding different behaviors of governments. 
In the following analysis, we start with an extended version of tax-smoothing theory and the 
possibility of default and varying degrees of institutional mechanisms for internal discipline. In the model, 
we try to show that the credibility of a country expands a country’s borrowing limit and then we investigate 
how the optimal choice of debt level is affected by credibility. Next, we test the model using a panel dataset 
of 61 countries and regress the estimated fixed effect on fiscal discipline.   
2 
 
The key finding of this study is that the high debts are likely to be due to a combination of factors. 
Specifically, there are some weaknesses in the policymaking institutions of countries that lead to relatively 
high demand for public debt. However, those institutions are sufficiently strong to provide moderately high 
rates of credibility in world capital markets. This raises their debt ceilings and allows them to borrow 
relatively more than many other countries. The implication of this finding is that fiscal risks may be 
reasonable if one assumes that the current conditions would continue.  
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 1.2 offers a review of existing literature on 
the determinants of public debt and fiscal policy. Section 1.3 develops a simple model of fiscal policy that 
highlights the role of institutional mechanisms in determining public debt with and without borrowing 
constraints. It describes the empirical implementation of the model and discusses the data, and particularly 
the construction of a fiscal discipline index. The results of the model's estimates are discussed in section 1.4 
and 1.5. Then the conclusions of the study are presented in section 1.6. 
 
1.2 Existing Literature 
Systematic efforts to explain fiscal policy started in the 1970s with two different approaches: 
neoclassical and institutional. The neoclassical approach emphasized the inter-temporal choices of the 
government treating decision-makers as a single actor that maximize some sort of social welfare. The 
institutional approach focused on the rule of structural interaction among multiple decision-makers in the 
process of budget formation. In recent years, the two approaches have come together in dynamic models 
of interaction among policy makers. Over time, the original neoclassical model has become a benchmark 
against which the efficiency of fiscal outcomes under various institutional scenarios is assessed.  In this 
section, we summarize the existing literature using these approaches and discuss their implications for our 
analysis.  
The neoclassical theory of fiscal policy is based on the idea that the government uses budget 
deficits as “tax smoothing” to minimize the distortionary burden caused by passing taxes. According to 
Barro’s (1979) theory, the optimal fiscal policy must equate the marginal distortionary effects of the 
government sector over time. Barro treats fiscal expenditures as given and shows that tax rates should 
remain constant over time to minimize the excess burden of taxation.  Lucas and Stocky (1983) show 
that extending the theory to stochastic environments does not change its main implications. 
For the institutional approach to the analysis of fiscal policy, the starting point has been the 
“common pool” problem (von Hagen, 1992; Alesina et al., 1999; Poterba and von Hagen, 1999). The 
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basic idea of this approach is that when many interest groups participate in the budget process, they may 
not fully internalize the cost of the public expenditures. It leads to inefficiently high expenditures and 
borrowing and as a result, the size of the government debt and budget deficit may be larger than what is 
optimal from the viewpoint of the economy as a whole. According to common pool theory, we can expect 
that the structure of the political system matters a lot in determining the size of the government spending. 
Roubini and Sachs (1989) analyze the OECD data and find that coalition and minority governments are 
subject to larger fiscal deficits than the majority governments. Alesina and Perotti (1995) examine the 
episodes of fiscal adjustment in OECD countries and indicate that coalition governments succeed less 
frequently than majority governments in implementing adjustment policies. Kontopoulos and Perotti 
(1999) also find that the number of coalition partners in government and the number of spending 
ministers both positively correlate with spending and debt issuance. 
Some researchers investigate the role of budget institution. The size of public spending can 
decrease close to the optimal level through political institution of a country. Past research suggests that 
the most effective mechanism to achieve coordination in budget systems is the delegation of control over 
budget aggregates to a responsible office with incentives to pursue broad interests (Gleich, 2003: von 
Hagen, 2002). This office can be the Minister of Finance or a similar entity that sets the initial ceilings on 
the total spending and deficit and is in a position to constrain changes to those levels in the approval and 
implementation process. Gleich (2003) develops the indexes summarize institutional characteristics of the 
budget processes which classifies the incentives to internalize the fiscal implications of their actions. The 
empirical results suggest that the design of budget processes has a strong impact on the average size of 
budget deficits and average public debt levels. It implies that the countries with high level of index are 
more tend to have less debt in Eastern and Central Europe. Hallerberg and Wolff (2008) investigate the 
effect of fiscal institutions such as the strength of the Finance minister in the budget process and deficits 
on interest spreads contained in bond yields of the countries now belonging to the Eurozone. 
This “common pool” approach implicitly assumes that an economy can borrow as much as it 
wants. However in reality, governments cannot run budget deficits if they cannot borrow. An economy 
that generated overspending in a “tragedy-of-the-commons” is in need of financing it by issuing bonds. If 
the repayment of its sovereign obligations is in doubt, then this economy may face binding constraints in 
issuing bonds and cannot enjoy overspending as much as it may wish to.  
The pioneering work of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) related the issue of sovereign default with the 
reputation. If a country defaults on its debt, then this country will lose access to the capital markets. It 
makes a country unable to smooth the consumption path by issuing bonds and creates disutility from 
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repudiating obligations and provides incentives to repay its debt. Lenders set credit ceilings based on the 
perceived borrower’s disutility and decide not to allow borrowing more than this limit. It provides a 
theoretical background of an endogenous debt ceiling and defaults. English (1996) investigates the default 
history of the U.S. states in the 1840's and finds that most states repaid their debts, in spite of a lack of 
sanctions. English claims that the states repaid to maintain access to capital markets, which again supports 
the reputational models of sovereign debt. 
Cole and Kehoe (1996) model the sovereign debts as a self-fulfilling debt crisis. In their model, 
there is a crucial interval of debt for which the government, although finding it optimal to repay old debt 
if it can sell new debt, finds it better to default if it cannot sell new debt. If government debt is in this 
interval, which we call the crisis zone, then the default on existing debts depends on the realization of a 
stochastic sunspot variable. 
Arellano (2008) analyzes the relationship between sovereign default and output fluctuation and 
finds that default is more likely in recessions because it is more costly for a risk averse borrower to repay 
debt. In the study, Arellano provides a model that has 3 intervals. If a country’s bond level is in the safe 
zone, there is no default risk and this country can issue additional bonds without lowering the price of 
bonds. But above this level, the default risk increases as the country issues more bonds and the price of 
bonds falls. Finally, there is a certain level where the country cannot generate positive revenue by issuing 
additional bonds above this level. 
Hallerberg and Wolff (2008) extend the sovereign defaults onto financial markets and connect the 
issue of credibility over repaying debt to budget institutions. They find that sovereign bond credit spreads 
rise as deficits increase because financial market players know that the persistent budget deficits will 
increase the default risk of sovereign debt. But such concerns can be mitigated by good fiscal institutions. 
Financial markets will affect less sensitively to the budget deficit of a country with good institutions 
because financial market players know that the budget deficits will not last longer.   
 However, the existing literature on budget institutions views that countries with stronger 
discipline mechanisms maintain lower spending and debt levels.  But as we show in this study, this need 
not be the case when a government faces a binding credit constraint. In that situation, an increase in the 
ability of the government to ensure discipline may raise its credibility and borrowing limit, inducing a 
positive relationship between institutional capabilities and observed debt levels. This effect is particularly 
important in the case of developing countries and plays a central issue in the present study. Taking 
account of the interactions between institutions and borrowing constraints is critical to understanding the 
role of fiscal institutions in the developing world. 
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1.3 A Simple Model of Government Debt  
1.3.1 The Structure of the Model 
 Consider an economy with discrete times and infinite horizon that has three players: A 
representative household, international bankers, and a government. 
 The household: The representative household receives a fixed endowment, y, of a consumption 
good every period. For its survival, the household also needs government services that have a time-varying 
stochastic cost, ݃௧, with the cumulative distribution function F(݃௧) and density function f(݃௧) defined over 
the compact and bounded set ܩ ⊂ Թା . In each given period t, this cost may be covered through a 
contemporaneous tax, ߬௧, or through borrowing from international bankers. The household is risk averse 
and its utility in each period is a concave function of its after-tax endowment in that period, ݑሺݕ െ ߬௧ሻ, 
where ݑᇱ ൐ 0 and ݑ" ൏ 0. The household maximizes its long-run utility, ܧ௦ ∑ ߚ௧ஶ௧ୀ௦ ݑሺݕ െ ߬௧ሻ, where ܧ௦ 
is the expectation operator in period s and β is the discount factor.  
 International bankers: There is a continuum of identical and risk neutral international bankers, 
each of whom wants to maximize its expected profits from bond purchases. The bankers discount factor is 
the same as that of the households, β. Given the price of government sold in period t, ݍ௧, bankers will be 
willing to buy bonds as long as ߚሺ1 െ ߜ௧ሻ െ ݍ௧ ൒ 0, where  is the probability that the government defaults 
on its debt next period. The default probability may depend on the amount of bond sold on the market, ܤ௧. 
Therefore, the bond price threshold above which bankers refuse to purchase government debt can be 
expressed as:  
(1.1) ݍሺܤ௧ሻ ൌ ߚሾ1 െ δሺܤ௧	ሻሿ 
 The Government: The government’s preference may deviate from that of the household.  In our 
model, government can borrow from the banker and these trades are based on bankers’ trust that the 
government will repay its debts in future period. However, default implies that the government breaks the 
previous commitment and it will damage government reputation. We assumed, therefore, that the 
government gains implicit benefit, ߙ, by honoring debt. We will discuss the value function of government 
in detail in next section. The government finances its expenditure, ݃௧, by collecting taxes or by issuing 
bonds. Since there are many competing bankers who are willing to purchase government debt at ݍሺܤ௧ሻ, the 
government can realize this price on its bonds. Therefore, its budget constraint can be expressed as: 
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(1.2) ݃௧ ൌ ߬௧ ൅ ݍሺܤ௧ሻܤ௧ െ ܤ௧ିଵ 
 
1.3.2 Recursive Equilibrium 
 The value function of the government in period t when it chooses to pay back its past debt and 
remain in the credit market is: 
(1.3) ܸ௖ሺܤ௧ିଵ, ݃௧, ߙ௧ሻ ൌ max஻೟ሼݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ ൅ ݍሺܤ௧ሻܤ௧െ	ܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ௧ሻ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ܸ௢ሺܤ௧, ݃௧ାଵ, ߙ௧ାଵሻሽ 
where ܸ௢ሺܤ௧, ݃௧ାଵ, ߙ௧ሻ is the government’s maximum payoff in period t + 1 if it has not defaulted in the 
past and	ߙ௧ is the implicit gains from honoring debt for example inflow of foreign investment, maintaining 
political stability and reputational gains in period t. If the government chooses to default and withdraw 
from the credit market forever, then its value function would be given by: 
(1.4) ܸௗሺ݃௧ሻ ൌ ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ሻ ൅ ߚܧ௧ܸௗሺ݃௧ାଵሻ 
Note that 
(1.5) ܸ௢ሺܤ௧, ݃௧ାଵ, ߙ௧ሻ ൌ maxሼܸ௖ሺܤ௧, ݃௧ାଵ, ߙ௧ሻ, ܸௗሺ݃௧ାଵሻሽ 
 To characterize the government’s strategy, we first examine the feasible range of net borrowing, 
ݍሺܤ௧ሻܤ௧െ	ܤ௧ିଵ, given the realization of government expenditure in period t, ݃௧. To this end, we first define 
the default set, ܦሺܤ௧ିଵ, ߙ௧ሻ, i.e., the set of expenditure realizations in period t for which default occurs 
given the initial debt in period t, ܤ௧ିଵ: 
(1.6) ܦሺܤ௧ିଵ, ߙ௧ሻ ൌ ሼ݃௧ ∈ ܩ ∶ 	ܸ௖ሺܤ௧ିଵ, ݃௧, ߙ௧ሻ ൏ ܸௗሺ݃௧ሻሽ 
 The following proposition shows that if ݃௧ is in this set (i.e., the government prefers to default), 
then there is no feasible borrowing that the nets benefits from borrowing is positive. i.e., ݍሺܤ௧ሻܤ௧െ	ܤ௧ିଵ ൅
ߙ௧ ൑ 	0. This result, though rather trivial, is helpful in proofs of other propositions. 
Proposition 1: If ܦሺܤ௧ିଵ, ߙ௧ሻ ് ∅ and the realization of government expenditure in period t is ݃௧ ∈
ܦሺܤ௧ିଵ, ߙ௧ሻ, then there is no ܤ௧ for which ݍሺܤ௧ሻܤ௧െ	ܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ௧ ൐ 	0  
Proof. We prove this proposition by way of contradiction. Suppose there exists a ܤ௧  for which 
ݍሺܤ௧ሻܤ௧െ	ܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ௧ ൐ 	0 Then,  
(1.7) ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ ൅ ݍሺܤ௧ሻܤ௧െ	ܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ௧ሻ ൐ ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ሻ 
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Since ܸ௢ሺܤ௧, ݃௧ାଵ, ߙ௧ାଵሻ ൒ ܸௗሺ݃௧ାଵሻ, then adding the two inequalities, for this given ܤ௧ we must have: 
(1.8) ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ ൅ ݍሺܤ௧ሻܤ௧െܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ௧ሻ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ܸ௢ሺܤ௧, ݃௧ାଵ, ߙ௧ାଵሻ ൐ ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ሻ ൅ ߚܧ௧ܸௗሺ݃௧ାଵሻ 
which suggests that there is a ܤ௧ such that ܸ௖ሺܤ௧, ݃௧, ߙ௧ሻ ൐ ܸௗሺ݃௧ሻ, thus contradicting the assumption 
that ݃௧ ∈ ܦሺܤ௧ିଵ, ߙ௧ሻ. █ 
 In our next step, we show that the government always chooses to default in period t if the 
realization of expenditure is above some threshold,  ݃ሺܤ௧ିଵሻ, and honors its debt otherwise. 
Proposition 2: If ܦሺܤ௧ିଵ, ߙ௧ሻ ് ∅ and ݃௧ ∈ ܦሺܤ௧ିଵ, ߙ௧ሻ, then	݃௧ ∈ ܦሺܤ௧ିଵ, ߙ௧ሻ  for all ݃௧ ൐ ݃௧. 
Proof. Let ܤത∗ = argmax஻೟൛ݑ൫ݕ െ ݃௧ ൅ ݍሺܤ௧ሻܤ௧െ	ܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ௧൯ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ܸ௢ሺܤ௧, ݃௧ାଵሻൟ  and let 	ܤ∗  be 
similarly defined for ݃௧. If 	݃௧ ∈ ܦሺܤ௧ିଵ, ߙ௧ሻ, then 
(1.9) ݑ൫ݕ െ ݃௧൯ ൅ ߚܧ௧ܸௗሺ݃௧ାଵሻ ൐ ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ ൅ ݍሺܤത∗ሻܤത∗ െ 	ܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ௧ሻ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ܸ௢ሺܤത∗, ݃௧ାଵ, ߙ௧ାଵሻ 
 Now if we show that 
(1.10) ݑ൫ݕ െ ݃௧ ൅ ݍሺܤത∗ሻܤത∗െ	ܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ௧൯ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ܸ௢ሺܤത∗, ݃௧ାଵ, ߙ௧ାଵሻ െ ሼ	ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ ൅ ݍሺܤ∗ሻܤ∗െ	ܤ௧ିଵ ൅
ߙ௧ሻ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ܸ௢ሺܤ∗, ݃௧ାଵ, ߙ௧ାଵሻሽ ൐ ݑ൫ݕ െ ݃௧൯ ൅ ߚܧ௧ܸௗሺ݃௧ାଵሻ െ ሼݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ሻ ൅ ߚܧ௧ܸௗሺ݃௧ାଵሻሽ 
 then summing up (1.9) and (1.10) yields an inequality that implies ݃௧ ∈ ܦሺܤ௧ିଵ, ߙ௧ሻ, thus prove 
the proposition.  To show (1.10), we rearrange its terms to get 
(1.11) ݑ൫ݕ െ ݃௧ ൅ ݍሺܤത∗ሻܤത∗െ	ܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ௧൯ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ܸ௢ሺܤത∗, ݃௧ାଵ, ߙ௧ାଵሻ െ ሼ	ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ ൅ ݍሺܤ∗ሻܤ∗െ	ܤ௧ିଵ ൅
ߙ௧ሻ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ܸ௢ሺܤ∗, ݃௧ାଵ, ߙ௧ାଵሻሽ ൐ ݑ൫ݕ െ ݃௧൯ െ ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ሻ 
 Since ܤത∗ is the optimal choice under ሺܤ௧ିଵ, ݃௧, ߙ௧ሻ, 
(1.12) ݑ൫ݕ െ ݃௧ ൅ ݍሺܤത∗ሻܤത∗ െ 	ܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ௧൯ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ܸ௢ሺܤത∗, ݃௧ାଵ, ߙ௧ሻ	 
൒ 	ݑ൫ݕ െ ݃௧ ൅ ݍሺܤ∗ሻܤ∗ െ 	ܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ௧൯ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ܸ௢ሺܤ∗, ݃௧ାଵ, ߙ௧ାଵሻ	  
 Therefore if  
(1.13)  
	ݑ൫ݕ െ ݃௧ ൅ ݍሺܤ∗ሻܤ∗ െ 	ܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ௧൯ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ܸ௢ሺܤ∗, ݃௧ାଵ, ߙ௧ାଵሻ െ
ሼ	ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ ൅ ݍሺܤ∗ሻܤ∗െ	ܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ௧ሻ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ܸ௢ሺܤ∗, ݃௧ାଵ, ߙ௧ାଵሻሽ ൐ 	ݑ൫ݕ െ ݃௧൯ െ ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ሻ
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holds, then through transitivity, we can find that equation (1.11) holds. By rearranging the terms in (1.13) 
we get 
(1.14) ݑ൫ݕ െ ݃௧ ൅ ݍሺܤ∗ሻܤ∗ െ 	ܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙݐ൯ െ ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ ൅ ݍሺܤ∗ሻܤ∗െ	ܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙݐሻ ൐ ݑ൫ݕ െ ݃௧൯ െ ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ሻ 
 Since	݃௧ ∈ ܦሺܤ௧ିଵ, ߙ௧ሻ, Proposition1 implies that  ݍሺܤ∗ሻܤ∗ െ 	ܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ௧ ൏ 0 for all available 
{ܤ∗, ݍሺܤ∗ሻሽ. Considering that the utility function is strictly concave, (1.14) must hold, which in turn implies 
that (1.10) must hold. Thus, if ݃௧ ∈ ܦሺܤ௧ିଵ, ߙ௧ሻ, then	݃௧ ∈ ܦሺܤ௧ିଵ, ߙ௧ሻ  for all ݃௧ ൐ ݃௧. █ 
 Default probability in period ݐ ൅ 1, ߜሺܤ௧ሻ, can be expressed by using a set of government 
expenditures where default,	ܦሺܤ௧, ݄ሻ, is preferred given bond level. 
 (1.15)       ߜሺܤ௧ሻ ൌ 	׬ ݂ሺ݃௧ାଵሻ݀݃஽ሺ஻೟,ఈ೟శభሻ	  
 In (1.15), we assumed the Markov transition of government expenditure. Since default happens 
when government expenditure shock, ݃௧ାଵ,	is bigger than a threshold, ݃	, Default probability ߜሺܤ௧, ߙ௧ାଵሻ 
can also be written: 
(1.16)       ߜሺܤ௧, ߙ௧ାଵሻ 	ൌ 	׬ ݂ሺ݃௧ାଵሻ݀݃஽ሺ஻೟,ఈ೟శభሻ	 ൌ 1 െ ܨሺ݃ሺܤ௧, ߙ௧ାଵሻሻ 
 In the following proposition, we show that the default set in each period is non-contracting in the 
initial bond level. In other words, if it is optimal for the government to default with a small amount of 
inherited debt, then default is also the optimal strategy with all larger debt levels. 
Proposition 3: If default is optimal for ܤଵ in some realization of ݃௧ାଵ	, then default is also optimal for 
ܤଶ	for the same ݃௧ାଵ	 for all ܤଵ ൑ ܤଶ. 
Proof : ݃௧ାଵ ∈ ܦሺܤଵ, ߙ௧ାଵሻ implies that  
(1.17)     ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ାଵሻ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ାଵܸௗሺ݃௧ାଶሻ  
൒ ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ାଵ ൅ ݍሺܤ௧ାଵሻܤ௧ାଵെܤଵ ൅ ߙ௧ାଵሻ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ାଵܸ௢ሺܤ௧ାଵ, ݃௧ାଶ, ߙ௧ାଶሻ   
 Since ܤଵ ൑ ܤଶ , the right-hand side of this inequality must be greater than ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ାଵ ൅
ݍሺܤ௧ାଵሻܤ௧ାଵെܤଶ ൅ ߙ௧ାଵሻ. Then, by transitivity, 
(1.18) ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ାଵሻ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ାଵܸௗሺ݃௧ାଶሻ   
൒ ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ାଵ ൅ ݍሺܤ௧ାଵሻܤ௧ାଵെܤଶ ൅ ߙ௧ାଵሻ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ାଵܸ௢ሺܤ௧ାଵ, ݃௧ାଶ, ߙ௧ାଶሻ   
 Hence ݃௧ାଵ ∈ ܦሺܤଶ, ߙ௧ାଵሻ. █ 
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 Now, we will show that the default set in each period is non-increasing in the indirect benefits 
from honoring contract. 
Proposition 4: If default is optimal for  ߙ௧ାଵଵ  in some realization of ݃௧ାଵ	, then default is also optimal for 
ߙ௧ାଵଶ 	for the same ݃௧ାଵ	 for all ߙ௧ାଵଶ 	൑ ߙ௧ାଵଵ . 
Proof : ݃௧ାଵ ∈ ܦሺܤ௧, ߙ௧ାଵଵ ሻ implies that  
(1.19) ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ାଵሻ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ାଵܸௗሺ݃௧ାଶሻ  
൒ ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ାଵ ൅ ݍሺܤ௧ାଵሻܤ௧ାଵ െ ܤ௧ ൅ ߙ௧ାଵଵ ሻ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ାଵܸ௢ሺܤ௧ାଵ, ݃௧ାଶ, ߙ௧ାଶሻ   
 Since ߙ௧ାଵଶ ൑ ߙ௧ାଵଵ , the right-hand side of this inequality must be larger than ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ାଵ ൅
ݍሺܤ௧ାଵሻܤ௧ାଵ െ ܤ௧ ൅ ߙ௧ାଵଶ ሻ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ାଵܸ௢ሺܤ௧ାଵ, ݃௧ାଶ, ߙ௧ାଶሻ. Then, by transitivity, 
(1.20) ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ାଵሻ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ାଵܸௗሺ݃௧ାଶሻ  
൒ ݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ାଵ ൅ ݍሺܤ௧ାଵሻܤ௧ାଵ െ ܤ௧ ൅ ߙ௧ାଵଶ ሻ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ାଵܸ௢ሺܤ௧ାଵ, ݃௧ାଶ, ߙ௧ାଶሻ   
 Hence ݃௧ାଵ ∈ ܦሺܤ௧, ߙ௧ାଵଶ ሻ. █ 
 Using the properties of default set, we can characterize the bond level as default risk changes. 
First, there is a level of bond, ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ ൒ 0, at which the default set is empty. i.e., whatever the realization 
of expenditure,	݃௧ାଵ, is, the government will not choose to default in period ݐ ൅ 1. Note that if G includes 
sufficiently large expenditure levels, we may have ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ ൌ 0. Also, there exists a bond level, ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ, 
at which the government always prefers to default in period ݐ ൅ 1	regardless of ݃௧ାଵ. 
(1.21) ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ ൌ sup	ሼܤ௧: ܦሺܤ௧, ߙ௧ାଵሻ ൌ ∅ሽ 
(1.22) ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ ൌ inf	ሼܤ௧: ܦሺܤ௧, ߙ௧ାଵሻ ൌ ܩሽ 
 Proposition 3 implies that if ܤ௧ ൑ ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ	, then there is no risk of default in period ݐ ൅ 1 and 
the government should be able to issue ܤ௧ at price ߚ in period	ݐ. If ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ ൏ ܤ௧ ൑ ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ , then a 
default might happen in period ݐ ൅ 1 for some	݃௧ାଵ. Considering that the price of bonds issued in period	ݐ 
is	ߚሾ1 െ ߜሺܤ௧, ߙ௧ାଵሻሿ and ߜሺܤ௧ሻ	is increasing in ܤ௧, the government should be able to issue ܤ௧ at the 
price of ߚሾ1 െ ߜሺܤ௧ሻሿ ൏ ߚ, which is decreasing in ܤ௧. The definition of ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ in (1.22) implies that the 
government cannot issue new bonds more than or equal to ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ  in period ݐ . Even though the 
government wishes to issue some ܤ௧ ൒ ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ, bankers know that the government will not pay these 
bonds back and will default in period ݐ ൅ 1. Therefore, they do not buy the government bonds in period	ݐ 
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at any positive price. Proposition 4 below shows that the maximum amount of riskless bond issue,	ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ,  
and the bond purchase ceiling,  ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ, are both increasing in benefit from honoring debt, α. 
Proposition 4: ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ and ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ are both increasing in ߙ௧ାଵ. 
Proof : From Proposition 3, we know that the government with higher gains from keeping contract, ߙ௧ାଵு , 
has lower probability of default in ݐ ൅ 1 than the government with low gains,	ߙ௧ାଵ௅ . Since realization of 
expenditure, ݃௧ାଵ,	is independent of ߙ௧ାଵ , decreasing ߜሺܤ௧, ߙ௧ାଵሻ  with respect to ߙ௧ାଵ  implies that 
default set, ܦሺܤ௧, ߙ௧ାଵሻ, is also decreasing in ߙ௧ାଵ. Therefore  
(1.23) ܦሺܤ௧, ߙ௧ାଵு ሻ ⊂ ܦሺܤ௧, ߙ௧ାଵ௅ ሻ.  
 Assume that for certain bond level ܤሺߙ௧ାଵ௅ ሻ, default set is empty for the country with low gains 
from keeping contract. i.e., ܦ൫ܤሺߙ௧ାଵ௅ ሻ, ߙ௧ାଵ௅ ൯ ൌ ∅. Then by (1.23), it is also optimal for high credibility 
country to pay the bond back. i.e., ܦ൫ܤሺߙ௧ାଵ௅ ሻ, ߙ௧ାଵு ൯ ൌ ∅.  
Also, assume that for certain bond level ܤሺߙ௧ାଵு ሻ, it is optimal for the high credibility government to 
default always in period ݐ ൅ 1. i.e., ܦ൫ܤሺߙ௧ାଵு ሻ, ߙ௧ାଵு ൯ ൌ ܩ. Then, again by (1.23), it is also optimal for 
low credibility government to default. i.e., ܦ൫ܤሺߙ௧ାଵ௅ ሻ, ߙ௧ାଵ௅ ൯ ൌ ܩ.  █ 
 Figure 1.1 summarizes the finding from previous propositions. Figure 1.1 illustrates that the 
revenue curve from issuing bond,	ݍሺܤ௧ሻܤ௧, extends to the right hand side as credibility goes up. Regarding 
the shape of the curve, bond price ݍሺܤ௧ሻ is ߚ  until ܤ௧ reaches ܤሺ݄ሻ. Therefore, ݍሺܤ௧ሻܤ௧	is increasing 
and has a slope ߚ up to ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ. If  ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ ൏ ܤ௧ ൏ ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ , then ݍሺܤ௧ሻ is decreasing in ܤ௧	and 
ݍሺܤ௧ሻܤ௧  will have an inverse U shape. Define ܤ෠௧ሺߙ௧ାଵሻ  be the bond issued in period t such that 
maximizes	ݍሺܤ௧ሻܤ௧.  It is easy to verify that ܤ෠௧ሺߙ௧ାଵሻ satisfies: 
(1.24) ܤ෠௧ሺߙ௧ାଵሻ ൌ െ ௤ሺ஻೟ሻങ೜ሺಳ೟ሻ
ങಳ೟
 
 Then, Risky borrowing region is between ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ	and ܤ෠௧ሺߙ௧ାଵሻ	because the government will 
not choose to issue bonds above	ܤ෠௧ሺߙ௧ାଵሻ. 
1.3.3 Optimal policy  
 In this section, we will derive the optimal bond issue in period t, ܤ௧, of government. In previous 
chapter, we showed that if default cost increases, the borrowing limit of the government increases. It can be 
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interpreted as the expansion of government budget set. However, is this constraint really binds? In other 
words, will the government issues bonds up to its ceiling? To examine this, we need to characterize the 
optimal behavior of the government. 
 First, consider the case where the government issues bond in no default region. i.e., optimal bond 
issue in period t, ܤ௧∗ሺߙ௧ାଵሻ ∈ ሾ0, ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻሿ. In this region, price of bond, ݍሺܤ௧ሻ, is indifferent of ܤ௧. Then 
it is easy to verify that the government issues the maximum amount of bond that can be issued without 
default risk. i.e., the government issues bond up to ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ. This outcome is quite intuitive. Since there is 
no cost of issuing additional bond such as increasing default risk or bond price falling, the government has 
an incentive to issue bond up to ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ.  
Next, consider the case where the government issues bond between ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ and ܤሺߙ௧ାଵሻ. In this case, we 
find that the government with high default cost will issue less government bond. 
Proposition 5: Optimal bond issue in period t, ܤ௧∗,	is decrease in contract credibilityߙ௧ାଵ. 
(1.25) ܸ௖ሺܤ௧ିଵ, ݃௧, ߙ௧ሻ ൌ max஻೟ሼݑሺݕ െ ݃௧ ൅ ݍሺܤ௧ሻܤ௧െ	ܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ௧ሻ ൅ 	ߚܧ௧ܸ௢ሺܤ௧, ݃௧ାଵ, ߙ௧ାଵሻሽ 
Proof : The government chooses ܤ௧	such that maximize (1.25). From FOC condition, ப௏
೎ሺ஻೟షభ,௚೟,௛ሻ
ப஻೟ ൌ 0, 
we get  
(1.26) డ௨ሺ௬ିఛ೟ାఈ೟ሻడሺ௬ିఛ೟ାఈ೟ሻ
డሺ௬ି௚೟ା௤ሺ஻೟ሻ஻೟ି	஻೟షభାఈ೟ሻ
డ஻೟ 	൅ 	ߚܧ௧
ப௏೚ሺ஻೟,௚೟శభ,ఈ೟శభሻ
ப஻೟ ൌ 0 
 By expanding (1.26), 
(1.27) డ௨ሺ௬ିఛ೟ାఈ೟ሻడሺ௬ିఛ೟ାఈ೟ሻ ቄ	
డ௤೟ሺ஻೟ሻ	
డ஻೟ 	ܤ௧ ൅	ݍ௧ሺܤ௧ሻ	ቅ 
൅	ߚܧ௧ሾ	ܨሺ݃ሺܤ௧, ߙ௧ାଵሻሻ డ௏
೎ሺ஻೟,௚೟శభ,ఈ೟శభሻ
డ஻೟ ൅
డிሺ௚ሺ஻೟,ఈ೟శభሻሻ
డ஻೟ ܸ
௖ሺܤ௧, ݃௧ାଵ, ߙ௧ାଵሻሿ	  
൅	ߚܧ௧ ቂ	ሺ1 െ ܨ൫݃ሺܤ௧, ߙ௧ାଵሻ൯ሻ ப௏
೏ሺ௚೟శభሻ
ப஻೟ ൅
డሺଵିி൫௚ሺ஻೟,ఈ೟శభሻ൯ሻ
డ஻೟ ܸ
ௗሺ݃௧ାଵሻቃ ൌ 0  
 Since ܸௗሺ݃௧ାଵሻ  is independent of maturing bonds, ܤ௧, in	period	ݐ ൅ 1	 , ப௏
೏ሺ௚೟శభ,ఈ೟శభሻ
ப஻೟ ൌ
0.	Using envelope condition,  ப௏೎ሺ஻೟,௚೟శభ,ఈ೟శభሻ	ப஻೟ ൌ െ
డ௨ሺ௬ି௚೟శభା௤ሺ஻೟శభሻ஻೟శభି	஻೟ାఈ೟ሻ
డሺ௬ିఛ೟శభሻ .  Now rewrite (1.27), 
then we get 
(1.28) డ௨ሺ௬ିఛ೟ାఈ೟ሻడሺ௬ିఛ೟ାఈ೟ሻ ቄ	
డ௤೟ሺ஻೟ሻ	
డ஻೟ 	ܤ௧ ൅	ݍ௧ሺܤ௧ሻ	ቅ 
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൅	ߚܧ௧ሾ	െܨ൫݃ሺܤ௧, ߙ௧ାଵሻ൯ డ௨ሺ௬ିఛ೟శభାఈ೟ሻడሺ௬ିఛ೟శభାఈ೟ሻ ൅ ݂ሺ݃ሺܤ௧, ݄ሻሻ
డ௚ሺ஻೟,ఈ೟శభሻ
డ஻೟ ܸ
௖ሺܤ௧, ݃௧ାଵ, ߙ௧ାଵሻሿ	  
൅	ߚܧ௧ ቂെ	݂ሺ݃ሺܤ௧, ߙ௧ାଵሻሻ డ௚ሺ஻೟,ఈ೟శభሻడ஻೟ ܸ
ௗሺ݃௧ାଵሻቃ ൌ 0  
 Again rearranging (1.28), we get 
(1.29) డ௨ሺ௬ିఛ೟ାఈ೟ሻడሺ௬ିఛ೟ାఈ೟ሻ ቄ	
డ௤೟ሺ஻೟ሻ	
డ஻೟ 	ܤ௧ ൅	ݍ௧ሺܤ௧ሻ	ቅ   
ൌ ߚܧ௧ሾܨሺ݃ሺܤ௧, ߙ௧ାଵሻሻ డ௨ሺ௬ିఛ೟శభାఈ೟ሻడሺ௬ିఛ೟శభାఈ೟ሻ  െ	݂ሺ݃ሺܤ௧, ߙ௧ାଵሻሻ
డ௚ሺ஻೟,ఈ೟శభሻ
డ஻೟ ሼܸ
௖ሺ∙, ߙ௧ାଵሻ െ ܸௗሺ∙ሻሽሿ 
 Finally optimal	ܤ௧∗ is 
(1.30) ܤ௧∗ ൌ െ ௤ሺ஻೟ሻങ೜ሺಳ೟ሻ
ങಳ೟
൅ ఉങ೜ሺಳ೟ሻ	
ങಳ೟ 	
ങೠሺ೤షഓ೟శഀ೟ሻ
ങሺ೤షഓ೟శഀ೟ሻ
ܧ௧ሾܨሺ݃ሻ డ௨ሺ௬ିఛ೟శభሻడሺ௬ିఛ೟శభሻ െ ݂ሺ݃ሻ
డ௚ሺ஻೟,ఈ೟శభሻ
డ஻೟ ሼܸ
௖ሺ∙, ߙ௧ାଵሻ െ ܸௗሺ∙ሻሽሿ 
 We know that price of bond is decreasing in	ܤ௧. i.e.,  డ௤ሺ஻೟ሻ	డ஻೟ ൏ 0	and threshold ݃ is decreasing in 
ܤ௧.	i.e.,	డ௚ሺ஻೟,௛ሻడ஻೟ ൏ 0 . It implies as the difference between ܸ
௖ሺ∙, ߙ௧ାଵሻ and ܸௗሺ∙ሻ	increases, optimal bond 
issue in period t, ܤ௧∗ , decreases. Also, note that ܸ௖ሺ∙, ߙ௧ାଵሻ െ ܸௗሺ∙ሻ  is larger when ߙ௧ାଵ  increases. 
Therefore, the government with higher credibility, ߙ௧ାଵ, issue less bond, ܤ௧∗. █ 
 
1.4 Empirical Data and Estimation 
1.4.1 Overview of the Data 
In this section, we present a general description regarding government debt-GDP ratio in different 
credibility groups. Standard and Poor’s (S&P), the bond rating company, provides country ratings for 
international investors in 21 categories from AAA to D and update country ratings when major credit 
events happen. This index is the country’s ability to pay its existing debts and can be understood as a 
broad measure of credibility. We observe the debt to GDP ratio in 5 different levels of S&P credit ratings.  
It is easy to find that the debt level shows a “U shape curve”. We can summarize the table in the 
following way: both most credible and least credible groups have a large level of debt to GDP but 
moderate credit groups (Single A and Double B countries) have a relatively low level of debt. The 
interpretation is quite interesting. The advanced countries can issue higher levels of debt because these 
countries have higher credibility and their debt ceilings are higher than other countries.  For the low 
credibility group, their debts are increasing in a steep way. It can be inferred from our theory that these 
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countries reach close to their debt ceilings and some countries may fall into the default zone.  But for the 
countries with moderate credibility, debt levels are contained at a low level though they have relatively 
better credibility. It implies that institutional features in those developing countries deter the requests for 
increases in debt issuance from political pressures though they have higher debt ceilings compared to the 
low credibility group.  Later in this study, we will see how the institutional features affect the debt levels 
of developing countries. Taking account of the interactions between institutions and borrowing 
constraints is critical to understanding the role of fiscal institutions in the developing world. 
1.4.2 Data Set and Key Variables 
This section describes the variables and the details of the empirical methodology. For empirical 
assessment, we build a country panel dataset during 1980 and 2010 for 60 developed and developing 
countries. The limit on the number of countries and observations is set by the availability of consistent data 
for the relevant variables, particularly information on fiscal performance. Data are obtained from World 
Economic Outlook (WEO), IMF1 and the main measure of public debt used in this study, the government 
debt as a percentage of GDP.  
For measuring credibility, I use the survey-based "contract viability" and “contract repudiation” 
indices available from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset (see Knack and Keefer, 1995). 
These indices measure the risks of modification in contracts in the form of cancellation or outright 
expropriation. Since ICRG provides "contract viability" from 2001, we used “contract repudiation” for the 
previous years and rescale the range between 0 and 10, with higher scores indicating lower risks. Our 
hypothesis is that the contract reliability is positively related to bi. In other words, the government faces a 
loose credit constraint and can have access to credit markets easily if its credibility increases. Figure 1.2 
graphs the data for the contract credibility index against debt to GDP rate and it shows the positive 
relationship between them. 
The measurement of the discipline index requires a more detailed discussion because there is no 
single source with a consistent indicator covering a large number of countries. To ensure that the 
regressions are based on data with sufficient cross-country variation, I use the common denominator of all 
                                                     
1 After IMF’s revision of its fiscal statistics reporting manual (Government Finance Statistics Manual, GFSM) from 
the cash-system to a format consistent with an accrual-basis (GFSM2001) in 2001, only a few member countries 
report their fiscal statistics according to GFSM2001. Many countries have stopped reporting their liabilities data to 
IMF and it leads to many missing values in debt statistics in GFS. Because of this missing value issue, we used the 
government statics from World Economic Outlook which are basically estimates of IMF staffs. 
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available regional data on budget institutions to construct a common index for them. These studies and their 
regional focuses are as follows:  
Central and Eastern Europe - Gleich (2003). 
Western Europe - Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2001). 
Latin America - Alesina et al. (1999). 
Middle East and North Africa - Esfahani (2001). 
South and East Asia - Lao-Araya (1998).  
Among these studies, the budget institutions index developed by Alesina et al. (1999) is based on 
the least amount of information, while the indices constructed by Esfahani (2001) and Hallerberg, Strauch, 
and von Hagen (2001) are the most data intensive.  Lao-Araya (1998) and Gleich (2003) use simpler 
versions of the latter study's index. For building a broad cross-country index, I adopt the methodology of 
Alesina et al. (1999) and apply it to the countries covered by the other four studies. For some of these 
countries, the data provided by the studies needed to be supplemented by examining other sources, which 
was done by consulting the relevant IMF, World Bank, and other publications. This approach ensured the 
largest set of countries in the database. The more detailed methods adopted in the other studies yield indices 
that incorporate more information about fiscal policy institutions. However, the Alesina et al. method 
captures important elements of the information covered by all other studies; hence the rationale for adopting 
it.  
The Alesina et al. method consists of ranking the answers to 10 questions, as presented in 
Appendix. The rankings of answers are reflected in the scores listed in the table, with higher scores 
reflecting greater opportunity for fiscal discipline.2 Questions 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8 pertain to issues regarding 
"borrowing constraint." The first three questions ask about the existence of constitutional constraints on the 
deficit, the importance of a macroeconomic plan as a constraint to the budget process, and the existence of 
borrowing constraints on the central government. Questions 7 and 8 relate to whether the deficit constraints 
are binding ex ante or ex post. The average of the scores for these five questions yields a "borrowing 
constraint sub-index." Questions 4, 5 and 6 highlight "agenda setting" powers of the finance minister (or 
whichever office is responsible for the overall budget design). Question 4 deals with the role of the finance 
minister within the government in the budget design stage. Questions 5 and 6 capture the relative position of 
the government vis-à-vis the legislature in the approval stage. The average score for these three questions 
                                                     
2 In Alesina et al. (1999), the scores range from 0 to 10. Here, I have scaled the range from 0 to 1. The purpose of 
rescaling is to avoid the regression coefficients that are very small and require many digits after the decimal point. 
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forms the "agenda setting sub-index." Questions 9 and 10 are concerned with whether or not the budget of 
the central government can be subverted and "contaminated" by the borrowing practices of other public 
agencies. The less the central government has control, and the more other agencies can influence the budget 
balance, the less meaningful is the government's budget plan.  The average of the scores for these two 
questions yields an "ex post control sub-index." Finally, to construct an overall "fiscal discipline index," we 
calculate the average of the three sub-indices. Note that all these indices range from 0 to 1, with higher 
values representing a greater ability to ensure discipline.  
The index of fiscal discipline thus constructed yields data for 69 countries.3 For most countries, the 
assessment of fiscal institutions is available for only one point in time. We use such observations for all 
years in our panel data because fiscal institutions do not change very often.  We dot graphed the 
relationship between fiscal discipline and public debt in Figure 1.3 The scatter diagram shows that fiscal 
discipline is positively correlated to public debt and the dispersion of public debt becomes large where the 
countries have moderate fiscal discipline. 
Figure 1.4 graphs the data for the fiscal discipline index against the contract reliability index 
during the 2000s decade. Graphically observing the relationship between two indexes in the overall 
region, we cannot see a clear positive correlation. However, the distribution shows quite different results 
when we look at the data of each region separately. In the Latin America and East, South-East Asia 
regions, there is a positive correlation between contract reliability and fiscal discipline. However, we 
cannot see a clear relationship between Europe and Middle East Asia. In those regions, there is a wide 
variance of fiscal discipline even though contract credibility is generally the same. Therefore, it seems 
natural to think how this variance affects fiscal outcomes. Once a country reaches a sufficiently high level 
of credibility, stronger fiscal institutions induce the government to borrow less. We can expect that the 
interaction term of budget institution and credibility has a negative sign. 
                                                     
3 These countries are: Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Korea, Rep., Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, 
United Kingdom, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yemen. 
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1.4.3 Other Explanatory Variables 
In the empirical work presented here, we use a typical set of variables to control for effects that are 
not (or should not) be captured by the variables representing Credibility and Fiscal Discipline. This set 
consists of the devaluation of currency, interest rate, unemployment rate, legislative effectiveness, rule of 
law, openness, demographic composition, ethno-linguistic fractionalization and history of banking sector 
crisis. 
Fluctuation of foreign exchange rate affects the value of foreign currency denoted borrowing in 
terms of local currency. For example, currency depreciation increases the value of foreign currency 
borrowing and it leads to the increase in deficit in local currency. Annual exchange rate data are obtained 
from Penn World Table.  
Interest rate debt servicing costs may affect the deficit but its net impact is not clear a priori. An 
increase in interest rate raise the borrowing cost and the country may want to borrow less during this 
period. It may work as a factor that decreases the deficit. However, in the case of refinancing the existing 
debt by issuing new bonds, the government needs to borrow regardless of interest rate and it leads to a 
larger deficit during a high interest period. Hallerberg et al. (2007) examine the development of fiscal 
rules and budget procedures in EU countries and find that the interest rate is positively correlated to the 
level of debt. For our regression, we use the real interest rate data from World Development Indicator 
(WDI).   
Unemployment rate that reflects the economic situation of a country is also a potential 
determinant of budget deficit. In general, a higher unemployment rate is expected to result in larger 
deficits because the government makes counter-cyclical fiscal policies during economic recession.  
Unemployment rate data is taken from WDI.   
We consider the political system of a country. One can expect that the well-developed checks and 
balances system between executive and the legislative body boosts up the cost of arranging hidden debt and 
eventually decreases hidden debt. Legislative effectiveness available from Cross-National Time-Series 
Data Archive (CNTS) by Arthur S. Banks has been employed to measure this institutional feature. This index 
takes a value between 0 and 3. A score of 0 implies that no legislature exists. A score of 1 refers to an 
ineffective legislative body. A score of 2 means a partially effective legislature. In other words, the 
executive’s effectiveness substantially outweighs, but does not completely dominate that of the legislature. 
A score of 3 implies that the legislative body is fully effective and has substantial autonomy in taxation 
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and disbursement. Higher level of legislative effectiveness leads to strong checks and we can expect that 
Legislative effectiveness is negatively related to public debt. 
Rule of law variables provided by ICRG may affect the fiscal output as well. The rule of law 
measures the impartiality of the legal system and the observance of the law of a country. The scores range 
from 0 to 6, and higher scores indicate better institutions. 
We get openness index from Pen World Table. Openness is obtained by dividing the sum of 
exports and imports by current gross domestic product. Greater openness is likely to increase the demand 
for expenditures on social insurance of the households exposed to risk (Rodrik, 1998). 
It is also believed that ethnic, linguistic, and religious heterogeneity lead to political instability 
and poor economic performance. In a cross-country setting, Easterly and Levine (1997) have shown that 
per capita GDP growth is inversely related to ethno-linguistic fractionalization in a large sample of 
countries. Alesina et al. (2003) develop the previous measures of ethnic, linguistic and religious 
fractionalization and construct more comprehensive measures of about 190 countries. They use the 
following formula to compute fractionalization: 
(1.31)  ܨݎܽ ௝ܿ ൌ 1 െ ∑ ௜ܵ௝ଶே௜ୀଵ  
where ௜ܵ௝ is the share of group ݅ (݅ =1…N) in country j. Therefore, it ranges from zero to one and a 
higher value implies that the country is more ethno-linguistically fractionalized. Though heterogeneity is 
believed to hamper coordination and make it difficult to implement efficient policies, its effect can be quite 
complex in the case of public debt policies. One reason is that while the lack of coordination may raise the 
demand for borrowing, credibility may also suffer and the supply of funds may not be forthcoming. Another 
complication is that heterogeneity may have different roles in different environments. For example, it may 
enhance the competitiveness of the political and economic system in democracies, while leading to greater 
exclusiveness under dictatorships.  
The Banking Sector Crisis has been added to control the sudden changes in government spending. 
Laeven and Valencia (2012) construct the database that includes all banking crises dates and costs, and 
policy responses during 1970-2010.  Based on this, we create a dummy that is equal to 1 if the country is 
under a banking crisis. Crisis in the banking sector also contributes to stock-flow adjustments (Weber 
2012). Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system such as bank runs, losses in the 
banking system, and/or bank liquidations can be considered as a banking crisis. Laeven and Valencia 
(2008) show that a trembling banking sector leads to output losses and increases the role of government 
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during financial crisis in response to significant losses in the banking systems that, after all, increase the 
liabilities of government.  
We also added variables for measuring demographic composition. The share of population above 
65 years out of total population may correlate with fiscal policy (Persson and Tabellini, 2004). A society 
with a larger elderly group may increase its public spending for welfare programs and it leads to an 
increase in public debt. The share of population above 65 years used here is available from WDI.  
There may be many other possible determinants of public debt. Some such variables have been 
used in the empirical literature on public debt, though the theoretical foundations for experiments have not 
been developed. I also experimented with several indicators of this type. But no significant result emerged 
and, therefore, I will not dwell on them in the rest of this study.  
We experimented with the GDP growth rate as a potential determinant of supply and demand for 
borrowing. In particular, one may expect faster growing countries have both greater credibility and greater 
demand for borrowing and, thus, end up running higher debt-GDP ratios. 
Corruption level of a country may also affect fiscal outcome. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) address 
the possibility that corruption is likely to increase the number of projects undertaken in a country, and to 
change the design of these projects by enlarging their sizes and complexity. Some recent analyses show 
that the presence of corruption can cause significant government borrowing and lead to larger public debt 
(Grechyna, 2011). To measure the corruption level of a country, we use corruption index from 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  This index assesses the corruption level within the political 
system, and ranges from 0 to 6. The higher scores indicate a lower corruption level. Our empirical finding 
shows that this index is negatively correlated with public debt. In other words, the countries with low 
corruption level are likely to be lower in debt level and corruption increases the public debt.     
The Database of Political Institutions (DBPI) consists of various data and ranks on political and 
bureaucratic characteristics of most countries in the world. District magnitude and government orientation 
index are from this dataset. District magnitude is the average number of representatives elected per 
electoral district. If the legislature is composed of lower and upper houses, our measure is the average of the 
two houses weighted by the numbers of each house's seats. In case no competitive election for the 
legislature exists, we give the value of zero to this variable. It is because the information we want to obtain 
from district magnitude is the probability of one-party majority government. As discussed above, this 
probability gets higher as district magnitude decreases. Since one-party majority government is always 
guaranteed in case no competitive election exists, we give a number less than one for the completeness of 
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our dataset. Government orientation has a value of 1 if the chief executive is from a conservative or 
right-wing party, and -1 if from a liberal or left-wing party. For the definitions of conservative and liberal 
party, we use the ones given by DBPI. The value of zero is given when the leader is a centrist or no specific 
information is available from DBPI.  
From the Polity IV database, we obtain democracy score that ranges from zero to 10. Higher scores 
imply that the country has more democratic polity. By including this variable, it takes account of the direct 
roles democracy may play in facilitating or impeding fiscal discipline. 
We also acquire plurality system dummy, margin of majority, legislative and executive indices of 
electoral competitiveness from DBPI. Plurality system dummy has a value of 1 if legislators are elected by a 
winner-take-all or first-past-the-post rule, as opposed to the system that parties get seats based on the 
percentage of votes they receive in the election (proportional representation system). In case both a plurality 
system and proportional representative system are used, we set plurality system dummy as one if the 
majority or all of the lower house seats are determined by a plurality system. Since this dummy variable 
gives similar information to that of district magnitude, either one of these two variables is used in actual 
regressions. Margin of majority measures the degree of a ruling party's control in the legislature. It is 
defined as the fraction of seats in the legislature occupied by the ruling party. Finally, legislative and 
executive indices of electoral competitiveness measure how competitive are the legislative or executive 
elections. Both indices have values from 1 to 7. If the election is more competitive or more democratic, they 
have higher values. For example, legislative index of electoral competitiveness is 7 if multiple parties won 
seats in the legislative election and neither of the parties won more than 75% of the seats.  
We also test the significance of the party fractionalization index, which describes the composition 
of political parties in the legislature. The formula for this index is as follows: 
(1.32) Party fractionalization index = 1 – ∑ si2 
where si is the proportion of members associated with the ith party in the lower house of legislature. If there 
is only one party in the legislature, this index has a value of zero. As the legislature is more fractionalized 
among different political parties, the index increases up to the highest possible value of one. Premier system 
dummy, which is one when the chief executive is a prime minister, is also from Arthur Bank’s dataset. 
Another variable we consider is the share of agriculture, which is inversely associated with the 
modernization of the economy. Poor agrarian economies have limited access to financial markets and the 
debt-GDP ratio should stay low.  Share of agricultural sector is taken from World Bank’s WDI. 
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The role of separation of powers in the determination of public finances has been explored by 
Persson and Tabellini (2000). They show that the size of government tends to be larger under a 
parliamentary system than under presidential systems where the executive is elected independently of the 
legislature. Persson and Tabellini's (2000) key insight is that separation of powers introduces checks and 
balances that reduce the rents that the politicians can extract from public resources. Their model does not 
have any direct implication for the size of public debt since its concern is the long-term determinants of 
government size when expenditures are matched by revenues. However, given the increased demand for 
public expenditures under parliamentary systems, it is possible that the tendency to borrow and smooth 
taxes and expenditures over time may also be stronger. We create 2 dummy variables that take the value of 
1 for the parliamentary or presidential system respectively. The data is constructed based on the 
information available at Cheibub et al. (2010). Although these dummies have expected signs, they do not 
prove significant. 
Finally, the index of legal central bank independence is from Cukierman, Niapti, and Webb (1992). 
It is calculated using the data for the term length and the appointment procedure of central bank governors, 
the independence of central bank policy formulation, and central bank objective that are stipulated by the 
laws. Crowe and Meade (2008) further suggest a measure of central bank independence and transparency 
and claim that greater central bank independence is associated with lower inflation. 
 
1.5 Empirical Results  
To investigate the implication of the public debt model previously developed, we consider the 
debt-GDP ratio of a country as an error-correction process, 
(1.33)      bt,i =  – (bt–1,i – b*t–1,i) + γ b*t–1, i + ηst,i + t,i 
where  is the first difference operator, bt,i is the debt to GDP of country i in year t and b*t,i  is the 
expected debt to GDP of country i in year t given its steady state characteristics.  is the speed of 
adjustment of  bt,i , st,i  is the effect of transitory determinants of bt,i , and γ and η are coefficients. t,i  is 
the random variable, which may not be i.i.d. For calculating the standard errors of estimates, we employ 
Newey and West’s heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation consistent (HAC) method. This ensures that our 
results will be driven by any remaining autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity. 
 We specify the relationship of b*t,i with the vector of institutional and economic characteristics 
of country i in year t as a linear expression. 
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(1.34)      b*t,i  =  Cit + Dit×Cit + Rit +i  
where s are parameters, Cit is a measure of enforceability of contracts in general, Dit is an index of 
institutional capability to maintain fiscal discipline, and Rti is a linear expression of other potential 
determinants of steady state public debt. i is the individual fixed effect of country i. Considering that 
building up in credibility expands the government bond issuance limit while stronger fiscal institutions 
induce the government to borrow less, we can expect that the public debt model previously developed 
implies the following hypothesis to be tested: 
(1.35)       >0 and <0. 
However, there may still be an omitted variables problem because fixed effects analysis 
eliminates the variables that do not change over time. Fiscal discipline index is the key variable in the 
analysis but only has one time observation. Therefore, fiscal discipline index will be dropped in our fixed 
effect analysis. For this reason, we run cross-sectional regression of the estimated individual country fixed 
effect on time-invariant variables such as fiscal discipline, language fractionalization, and regional 
dummies. This cross-sectional analysis will help investigate the role of fiscal discipline. To control the 
non-observable influences on fiscal policy related to geographic location or economic development, we 
add regional dummies such as South East Asia, Middle East Asia and North Africa, Latin America, 
European Union, and East Central Europe. 
(1.36)      i = Di +Zi+i
where Di is the fiscal discipline of country i, Zi is a linear expression of other time-invariant factors of 
country i including regional dummies, s are the coefficients and iis the random variable.  
Table 1.2 summarizes the outcomes from fixed effect analysis and the results are quite consistent 
with our prediction. 
Let us start from the variables in Steady State Expression. Credibility is positively correlated with 
public debt at a 5% significant level. However, the coefficient of interaction between credibility and fiscal 
discipline has a statistically significant negative sign. As expected, there is a negative correlation between 
credibility and fiscal discipline. The effect of credibility might decrease with a high level of fiscal 
discipline. It implies that stronger fiscal institutions induce the government to borrow less once it reaches 
a sufficiently high level of credibility. For governments that do not face a credit constraint, better fiscal 
institutions tend to lower the debt level. 
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Regressions reveal that unemployment rate is positively correlated with public debt. In general, a 
higher unemployment rate is expected to result in larger deficits because the government makes 
counter-cyclical fiscal policies during economic recession.  
One interesting result is that the real interest rate is positively correlated with debt though it is 
not significant. It implies that the refinancing for the maturing debt become more costly and it increase 
the debt of a country.  We test the result with other various interest rate measures but no significant 
changes emerged. It support that the outcome is quite robust regardless of the interest rate measures. 
The rule of law, which could be considered as an alternative index of credibility of a country, is 
positively correlated to debt with 5% significance. It implies that the lack of rule of law undermines the 
credibility of the government, and, as a result, the government faces tighter credit constraints in financial 
markets. 
Legislative effectiveness, which scores between 0 and 3, has an expected negative sign. One can 
expect that the well-developed checks and balances system may reduce the debt. One interesting 
observation is that the coefficient of the quadratic term of legislative effectiveness is significant while the 
coefficient of original values is statistically insignificant. It implies that public debt decrease in a faster 
way when there is an improvement in legislative effectiveness. Regression (1) in Table 1.2 does not 
contain this variable; regression (2) uses the original values of legislative effectiveness as an explanatory 
variable; and regression (3) uses the square of the original value as an explanatory variable. 
For the short term effects, we include the banking sector crisis dummies, currency depreciation, 
aging of society, and GDP per capita.  First, banking sector crisis dummy, which is equal to 1 if the 
country is under a banking crisis, has a strong positive correlation with government debt. It implies that a 
trembling banking sector increases the role of government during a financial crisis in response to 
significant losses in the banking systems that, after all, increase the role of government. 
The increase in the share of population above 65 years out of the total population turns out to be 
positively correlated with debt to GDP rate. It implies that societies with larger elderly groups need to 
increase their public spending for the welfare programs. 
Currency devaluation is positively correlated with public debt and turns out to be significant in 
the fixed effect model.  The effect of currency devaluation on public debt may be related to accounting 
method. Fluctuation of foreign exchange rate affects the valuation of existing debt denoted in foreign 
currencies. For example, currency depreciation increases the value of foreign currency debt in terms of 
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local currency and it leads to the increase of public debt. Therefore, we can expect the coefficient of 
currency devaluation to have a positive sign. 
After fixed effect analysis, we regress the estimated individual country fixed effect on fiscal 
discipline, language fractionalization, openness and regional dummies to investigate the role of fiscal 
discipline. Table 1.3 summarizes the outcomes from cross-sectional analysis. The results show that the 
coefficient on fiscal disciple is highly significant at the 0.1% level. It implies that a country with stronger 
fiscal discipline has greater ability to borrow and smooth out shocks.  
Language fractionalization is found to have a negative coefficient. At first sight, the negative sign 
may contradict our prediction because using different languages within a country may deter the economic 
growth and increase public debt. However, the empirical result shows that this is not the case because the 
heavily fractionalized country stays underdeveloped, has limited access to financial markets and its 
borrowing level stays low. 
Openness, which is the share of exports and imports out of GDP, has a positive sign though it is 
not significant. It is because greater openness is likely to increase the demand for expenditures on social 
insurance of the households exposed to risk. In particular, this tends to raise the public debt. 
 
1.6 Conclusion  
This study investigates the roles of credibility and fiscal discipline on the level of public debt and 
offers an explanation for the variation of public debt among countries. Considerable existing literature 
implicitly states that better fiscal institutions reduce the level of government expenditure and public debt 
and help to solve the overspending caused by the “common pool” problem. However, our analysis finds 
that there is a positive relationship between institutional capabilities and observed debt levels for the 
countries with adequate levels of credibility. It is because an increase in the ability of the government to 
ensure discipline may raise its credibility in international financial markets, and gives more incentives to 
borrow more. However, if the level of credibility is very strong, then the countries may not want to fully 
utilize their favorable borrowing positions for long run fiscal sustainability. 
By using a simple model, we show that the bond issuance ceiling expands as a country builds up 
credibility, i.e., countries are able to issue more bonds because the higher credibility reduces the concerns 
over repudiation of existing debt. The role of credibility on optimal level of debt has an opposite direction. 
Even though credibility expands the bond issuance ceilings, the optimal level of public debt become 
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smaller as the country gains more credibility and yields more benefit from maintaining access to capital 
markets.   
We used a panel dataset of 61 countries to examine the implications of the model. From the 
empirical study, we find that both contract reliability and fiscal discipline are positively correlated with a 
steady state level of public debt. But the interaction between contract reliability and fiscal discipline index 
has a negative effect on public debt. This empirical finding again supports our prediction that 
improvement in fiscal and credit-related institutions take the government more toward a situation where it 
has greater options to borrow and smooth out debt and other shocks. The countries with a moderately high 
rate of credibility issue bonds up to or close to its upper bounds because adequate credibility helps these 
countries to access international borrowing markets. However, some weaknesses in the policymaking 
institutions in countries lead to relatively high demand for public spending and they end up borrowing 
relatively more than other countries. Once a government reaches a sufficiently high level of credibility, 
stronger fiscal institutions induce the government to borrow less.  
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Chapter 1  Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1.1 Debt to GDP in 2000s 
 
Credit ratings of Sovereign Bond4 Mean St. dev Median 
  Double AA and above 56.65% 25.31 51.04% 
  Single A 35.14% 27.23 28.32% 
  Triple B 38.79% 10.30 42.16% 
  Double B 54.78% 21.43 55.81% 
  Single B and Below 59.35% 28.71 55.57% 
  
                                                     
4 List of countries in each category:  
Double AA and above countries (18): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
United States. 
Single A countries (13): Bahamas, Chile, Czech, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malaysia, Slovak Republic, Trinidad and Tobago. 
Triple B countries (5): Bulgaria, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Thailand. 
Double B countries (12): Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Jordan, Morocco, 
Panama, Peru, Philippines. 
Single B and Below countries (10): Argentina, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Indonesia, Jamaica, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
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Table 1.2 Fixed Effect Analysis 
(Dependent Variable: First difference of Debt/GDP) 
Regression (1) (2) (3) 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficients P-value
Speed of Adjustment 0.2145 0.000 0.2137 0.000 0.2143 0.000
Steady State Expression     
  Constant -289.8190 0.000 -283.1703 0.000 -278.7955 0.000
  Contract Reliability 18.9948 0.0183 19.2322 0.0053 19.7496 0.004
  Reliability×Fiscal discipline -0.3389 0.0124 -0.3396 0.0037 -0.3336 0.0041
  Real interest rate 0.1865 0.6279 0.1749 0.424 0.1260 0.5632
  Unemployment rate 3.2109 0.000 3.2106 0.000 3.2865 0.000
  Rule of Law 4.7616 0.0428 4.9912 0.0126 5.2954 0.0079
  Legislative Effectiveness -5.1100 0.3629  
  Legislative Effectiveness2   -5.4219 0.0143
Short-term effects     
  Banking Crisis 1.8079 0.0719 1.8670 0.0255 1.9508 0.0191
  Currency Depreciation 24.8494 0.0187 24.8836 0.000 25.0263 0.000
  Lagged first difference of 
the Share of 65 above 9.2080 0.0128 9.2308 0.0056 9.0493 0.0064
  Lagged first difference of 
the log GDP per Capita -22.4652 0.006 -22.5159 0.0064 -23.1210 0.0049
Numbers of Observation 748 748 748 
Numbers of Countries 61 61 61 
R2 0.6099 .6106 .6137 
p-values are based on Newey-West Standard errors, Country and year fixed effect are included in the 
regression but not listed in the table.  
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Table 1.2 (cont.) 
 
List of Countries (61) : Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, 
United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen Rep. 
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Table 1.3 Cross Sectional Analysis 
(Dependent Variable: Estimated Individual Fixed effect) 
 
Regression (1) (2) (3) 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
Constant -409.1158*** 0.000 -398.3*** 0.000 -378.6*** 0.000 
Fiscal Discipline 34.3542*** 0.000 34.41*** 0.000 34.69*** 0.000 
Openness 14.0189 0.140 14.00 0.142 12.65 0.181 
Language 
Fractionalization -30.5815
* 0.089 -30.19* 0.093 -27.93 0.133 
Middle East North Africa  -29.6047 0.144 -36.76* 0.068 -61.47*** 0.003 
Latin America  -3.2350 0.880 -5.737 0.786 -15.53 0.453 
South Asia  53.1466
** 0.050 51.28* 0.068 43.65 0.196 
East, South East Asia  8.9022 0.696 2.449 0.915 -17.94 0.445 
European Union  11.5065 0.560 11.54 0.557 13.95 0.486 
East Central Europe  -18.4414 0.461 -18.64 0.451 -16.04 0.516 
High income not OECD  -0.2405 0.987 0.364 0.979 5.700 0.666 
N 60 60 60 
R2 0.7953 0.799 0.801 
    p-values are based on Robust Standard errors 
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Figure 1.1 Government Revenue Curve 
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Figure 1.2 Contract Reliability and Debt-GDP Rate 
 
 
     Source: Political Risk Services, ICRG and World Economic Outlook from IMF 
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Figure 1.3 Fiscal Discipline and Debt to GDP rate 
 
 
 Source: Author’s calculation based on various sources, and WEO 
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Figure 1.4  Fiscal Discipline and Contract Credibility in 2000s 
 
  Source: Author’s calculation based on various sources, and ICRG 
  
2
4
6
8
10
Fi
sc
al
 D
is
ci
pl
in
e 
In
de
x
2 4 6 8 10
Contract Reliability Index
33 
 
Figure 1.5 Fiscal Discipline and Contract Credibility of each region in 2000s  
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CHAPTER 2 
Hiding Public Debt: 
When Accountability Hits Governments That Hide Public Debt 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Governments often have financial commitments and contingent liabilities that do not receive 
explicit budgetary allocations or even official recognition. Such "hidden" liabilities can be a cause of 
concern for fiscal and macroeconomic stability (Polackova, 1998). Less transparent fiscal systems tend to 
produce more "surprise" liabilities of significant magnitude with destabilizing effects, as the recent 
economic crises in Europe and elsewhere have amply shown. Yet, governments seem to have an appetite 
for shifting liabilities off budget, especially as a means of avoiding badly needed fiscal adjustments 
(Easterly, 1999). The sudden realization of hidden liability can be a matter of not only contingent liability 
but also systematic factors that motivate policy makers to hide part of their expenditures. Despite the 
importance of the issue, there are very few studies of the forces at work and of why some governments 
tend to generate disguised spending much more than others do. This paper is an attempt to fill that gap by 
developing a simple model of hidden public debt and putting it to empirical test.  
The main views of hidden public debt examined so far in the literature are developed in twofold. 
One group of researchers has investigated how the constraints on government fiscal activities affect the 
tendency of governments to resort to off-budget activities. Externally imposed constraints aimed at fiscal 
discipline are also common in international pacts and multilateral arrangements, as in the European 
Union's Maastricht Treaty and IMF conditionality. If such arrangements merely cause governments to shift 
their spending off-budget, then fiscal adjustment may be an illusion (Easterly, 1999). Empirical 
investigation among EU countries revealed that countries tried to bypass the Maastricht Treaty Rules by 
increasing off-budget activities (von Hagen and Wolff, 2006). Another grouping of the literature focuses 
on how off-budget activities are related to major economic events. Kharas and Mishra (2001) report that 
fiscal deficits that include hidden government activities are more relevant than official deficit figures in 
explaining the currency crisis of a country. Bernoth and Wolff (2008) claim that a government’s tendency 
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to hide its liabilities from budget is perceived by financial market participants and financial markets 
penalize fiscal misreporting by charging higher spreads.  
However, the existing literature is still quite limited and, in part, sketchy. In particular, there are 
no comprehensive studies that investigate what factors motivate the policymakers to hide part of the 
public expenditures and mitigate the adverse incentives of politicians. Country specific characteristics 
such as economic conditions and the design of its institutional features could induce the different 
behaviors in hiding expenditures. For example, governments with higher exposed debts may have greater 
incentives to keep their expenditures out of sight, and the borrowing cost of a country may raise the level 
of hidden activities too. On the other hand, if a country’s credibility is already high in the financial market 
and it is enjoying favorable funding condition, then that country finds it more costly to repudiate its debt, 
which includes explicit and implicit ones, and it discourages the excess hidden spending. 
The model developed in this paper provides a framework for the systematic analysis of the above 
issues and offers a number of new insights and hypotheses. We also adopted quantile regression for 
empirical analysis. Quantile regression is helpful in verifying how variables play different roles in 
explaining the level of hidden debt at each quantile of the conditional distribution. For example, the effect 
of official borrowing on the hidden debt might be small for some countries while dramatically increasing 
hidden debt for others. This is quite important because one country may have hidden assets, which is the 
opposite of hidden debt. The traditional least square method cannot separate these, but quantile analysis 
enables us to estimate the coefficients in different percentiles of distribution and we can separate this 
hidden asset case. Another issue in empirical analysis is the measurement of hidden debt, which is carried 
out in an indirect way because direct measures are nearly impossible to find. The indicator that we 
propose consists of the amount of net hidden public liabilities that become exposed each year. This 
variable can be measured by the change in public debt, adjusted for the declared budget deficit and base 
money expansion. We refer to this indicator as Stock-Flow Adjustment (SFA), 5 which will be discussed in 
more detail later.  
Using SFA may seem to have a drawback because it reflects both contingent liabilities and the 
hidden part of public expenditures. We may want to separate the observed hidden debt into two parts: one 
is the revealed contingent liabilities that the government had guaranteed explicitly or implicitly for its 
quasi-government agencies or financial institutions. The other part of SFA is the off-budget activities that 
                                                     
5 Stock-Flow Adjustment is a concept to measure the size of hidden debt and we will handle more details of this in 
section 2.4.1. 
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the government made intentionally to increase public expenditures without public scrutiny. Even though 
those two are similar in the sense that they are hidden from the public, the realization process can be quite 
different. The exposure of contingent liabilities may be a random process in normal situations but also can 
be heavily influenced by external shocks such as a banking and sovereign debt crisis. Therefore, its 
revelation is quite difficult to expect beforehand. The hidden expenditure, on the other hand, may be 
revealed at a relatively consistent rate because the government needs to pay its maturing debt. While our 
study focuses on factors that influence the activities of hidden expenditure, carrying out the analysis 
through SFA reflects the combination of both contingent liabilities and hidden expenditures.   
It should also be pointed out that SFA is likely to have other important applications, especially in 
the study of fiscal policy. Past research in that area has treated deficit figures based on budgetary data as 
the direct measure of public deficit and has equated it with changes in the net amount of debt. That 
equation needs to be reexamined in light of the sizable values that SFA seems to take. 
In the rest of this paper, we first briefly review the existing literature on hidden public debt in 
section 2.2. The model that guides our work is developed in section 2.3. Section 2.4 discusses the 
empirical methodology and section 2.5 presents the econometric results. Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Hidden Fiscal Spending and Borrowing: A Review of Issues and Hypotheses 
There is a large amount of literature, produced nowadays mostly by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, that describes the variety of ways in which governments incur hidden 
liabilities.6 This literature also argues for fiscal transparency and calls for the inclusion of all government 
activities and liabilities in official budget accounts. Complete fiscal transparency, however, is largely an 
ideal. In reality, all governments have some sort of off-budget accounts and omit some of their liabilities 
and assets from official statistics, by design or by default. Parts of a government's de facto fiscal liabilities 
that do not show up as part of its official debt can be hidden in the accounts of lower level governments, 
special funds, public enterprises, or implicit or explicit commitments to the private sector. As a result, a 
key question is what factors can enable and motivate governments to make their budgets more 
comprehensive and transparent. 
As pointed out above, external and domestic pressures to keep public debt low may give rise to 
the incentive to conceal expenditures and liabilities. However, it is natural to expect the effects to depend 
                                                     
6 For a recent survey, see Polackova (1998). IMF's website, www.imf.org, provides detailed discussions on fiscal 
transparency and a comprehensive list of references. 
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on the characteristics of those pressures and the conditions under which they are applied. Some pressures 
are political and electoral, while others are explicit rules that must be enforced through domestic checks 
and balances (such as balanced budget laws), and still others are external constraints imposed by financial 
markets or arranged by multilateral entities. When such constraints are not vigilantly enforced or when 
they focus on narrow fiscal measures, the government is more likely to find opportunities to undermine 
them through hidden debt techniques. But when the constraints are more comprehensive and there are 
influential agents inside and outside the government that are keen to enforce them, then there is less 
chance that the restrictions may be evaded. Especially when the constraints are long term, eventually they 
may become consequential as the government comes to deal with the expenditures that it manages to hide 
in the short-run.  
To understand the conditions under which fiscal constraints may breed hidden debt, it is useful to 
start with the motives for "overspending" against which the constraints are supposed to guard. A 
straightforward motive, well-known from the political economy literature, is that the politicians may 
value government expenditure more than the public because it provides them with greater political or 
economic advantages. The resources can be used for buying off key voters or satisfying influential 
constituencies and special interests. This motive is stronger when policymaking is uncoordinated and 
common pool problems arise over public resources (Alesina and Perroti, 1999). The reason is that in such 
situations each interest group represented in the policymaking process bears a small part of the cost of its 
preferred programs when they are funded out of public purse. As a result, there may be a divergence 
between the private and social costs of programs for each interest group, inducing overexploitation of 
fiscal resources, especially in the form of public debt that falls on the shoulders of future generations 
(Velasco, 1999).  
To avoid inefficient fiscal outcomes, interest groups need to coordinate their actions and ensure 
that there are mechanisms in place that help everyone internalize the common pool externalities. But 
coordination possibilities depend on the structure of the polity. In particular, more fractionalized and more 
polarized polities face greater difficulties in coordinating action over fiscal policy (Roubini and Sachs, 
1989). Such polities are more likely to resort to hidden debt.7  
                                                     
7 Aside from the macro political institutions, the details of budgetary procedures should also matter for the extent of 
liabilities acquired off budget. Ex ante agreements on budget aggregates or their delegation to a central budget 
authority have been found to help increase fiscal discipline as far as explicit government accounts are concerned 
(Poterba and von Hagen, 1999). Thus, one might expect such mechanisms to reduce the demand for hidden debt as 
well. We do not examine this issue in this paper because there is little data on such factors for the countries and the 
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Crisis in the banking sector also contributes to SFAs (Weber, 2012). Significant signs of financial 
distress in the banking system such as bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations 
can be considered a banking crisis. A trembling banking sector leads to output losses and increases the 
role of government during a financial crisis in response to significant losses in the banking system, which, 
after all, increase the liabilities of the government (Laeven and Valencia, 2008).  
A crucial factor that is likely to facilitate the evasion of spending and deficit restrictions is 
extensive government intervention in markets. When the government uses market controls to reallocate 
and redistribute resources, it often puts pressure on some economic agents to give up their resources in 
exchange for promises of future compensation. Indeed, many government interventions, such as wage and 
price controls, implicitly create an obligation for the government to rescue the affected parties in case of 
adverse shocks. For example, between 1997 and 1999, the government of Korea had to commit large 
amounts of public funds to save the country's banking system from devastation by the foreign currency 
crisis. Though the banks and financial institutions were private firms, the government had to bail them out 
because it had intervened in the financial system for a long time and had used it for channeling credit to 
selected industries and enterprises. The incident made the government's debt jump even though the 
history of its low budget deficits seemed to indicate dutiful discipline. Similar cases can be found in 
European Countries. In Germany, the debt level increased by more than 6% of GDP in addition to the 
deficit in 1995, when the German federal government officially assumed the debt previously hidden in the 
Treuhandanstalt, the holding company of former East German industries. In Greece, debt level increased 
by almost 19% in addition to the deficit in 1994, when the debt of the Greek government at the Bank of 
Greece was officially recorded as public debt (Von Hagen and Wolff, 2006). Examples of this kind 
abound in other countries. More extensive interventions make it easier for the government to use the 
private economy as a means of accomplishing its policy objectives, but they also entail potential financial 
liabilities outside the normal budgetary channels.  
One form of intervention that is often identified as a source of hidden liability is government 
ownership of firms. The common view is that when a government owns enterprises, it can direct the 
managers to use the resources and the borrowing capacity of those firms to pay for tasks that are 
essentially fiscal functions. For example, the United States government created FICO (The Financing 
Corporation) in 1987 and authorized it to borrow $10.8 billion to be used for deposit insurance purposes, 
without appropriating any funds to deal with the contingent liabilities of such an operation (Joulfaian and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
time span of our sample.  
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Marlow, 1991). Another example is the French government's takeover of the pension liabilities of France 
Telecom in 1997 in exchange for a budgetary receipt from the company amounting to about 0.5 percent of 
GDP (Easterly, 1999). All such activities create commitments that can impose large burdens on the 
government at later dates in a contingent or more predictable fashion. A prominent example of realization 
of large contingencies is the 1982 Brazilian debt crisis in which large sums borrowed by public 
enterprises had to be assumed by the federal government, with major adverse effects on the economy 
(Coes, 1995: 62-65). Of course, public enterprises also have assets that may produce occasional capital 
gains in the form of privatization proceeds or enhanced financial returns. Public enterprises may not be 
operating efficiently, but their net assets are not necessarily negative and the liabilities that they pass on to 
the government do not always exceed the capital gains that they offer. Indeed, some observers have 
criticized privatization in countries under fiscal stress as short-term palliatives that may cause more 
long-term problems due to asset depletion (Easterly, 1999). 
Public enterprises can be seen as a special form of extra-budgetary funds that governments use to 
make their fiscal conditions look sounder. Another major example is pension funds. Many countries have 
pay-as-you-go pension systems that accumulate surpluses in their early stages. Commonly, governments 
borrow the surplus of pension funds in these stages at low interest rates or keep their own contributions 
low, thus maintaining their explicit budget deficits low for a while. However, this practice eventually 
leads to shortages of funds needed for pension payments in later periods. It is not difficult to find pension 
funds whose present values are negative, with the government ultimately being forced to cover the 
shortage, which is in fact its own hidden debt. 
Other economic characteristics of the country such as openness and vulnerability to internal and 
external volatility are also likely to be relevant for the calculus of hidden liabilities. Greater openness is 
likely to increase the demand for expenditures on social insurance for the households exposed to risk 
(Rodrik, 1998). In particular, this tends to raise the contingent liabilities of the government, which are 
typically off budget. It also indirectly encourages policymakers to resort to more hidden borrowing to 
keep the official accounts look healthy despite the increased fiscal burden.  
There are also several segments of the literature that deal with the empirical side of hidden debt.  
Von Hagen and Wolff (2006) study how governments behave when external fiscal rules are imposed to 
constrain the government deficit in EU countries. They provide empirical evidence of creative accounting 
in the European Union.  In other words, the EU imposes fiscal constraints such as a 3% deficit limit, and 
then these rules have induced governments to use SFAs, a form of creative accounting, to hide deficits. The 
tendency to substitute SFAs for budget deficits is especially strong for the cyclical component of the deficit, 
for in times of recession the cost of reducing the deficit is particularly large.   
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Kharas and Mishra (2001) point out the problem of using conventional deficit measures to 
explain currency crises and provide an alternative way to measure the hidden budget deficit. Instead of 
using the conventional budget deficit reported by the government, they devise actual deficit as the 
difference between the change in government debt and the change in money supply. They finally define 
the hidden debt as the gap between actual deficit and conventional deficit. They demonstrate that there is 
a close link between the number of currency crises and hidden and actuarial deficits. This link is 
nonexistent if one uses conventional deficits in place of actuarial deficits. 
Weber (2012) notices the existence of large and persistent discrepancies, so called stock flow 
adjustments, between the annual change in public debt and the budget and investigates the relationship 
between fiscal transparency and the discrepancies. Weber finds that the more fiscally transparent the 
countries, the smaller these SFAs tend to be. The contribution of SFAs to increases in debt is likewise 
smaller in countries with above average fiscal transparency. 
Even though much of the literature did pioneering work in studying the existence of hidden debt 
and the characteristics of it, there are some limitations of the previous research. First, there is no 
theoretical model able to explain the size of hidden debt and under what situations government prefers to 
pursue hidden spending. Previous literature has tried to capture the importance of hidden debt in 
explaining certain behaviors such as fiscal rule and transparency but do not provide the comprehensive 
and theoretical model for explaining the size of hidden debt. Furthermore, previous papers have not 
studied the role of institutional background in determining the size of hidden debt. Sizes of hidden debt 
vary quite a bit across the countries and this country specific characteristic may be determined by the 
socio-economic structure of these countries. Also, previous literature did not try to separate the revelation 
mechanism between contingent liabilities and the hidden part of public expenditure. Even though those 
two are similar in the sense that they are hidden from the public, the realization process can be quite 
different. The exposure of contingent liabilities may be heavily influenced by external shocks such as 
banking and sovereign debt crisis, and, therefore, its revelation is quite difficult to expect beforehand. The 
hidden expenditure, on the other hand, may be revealed at a relatively consistent rate because the 
government needs to pay its maturing debt. The observed SFA data contains both types and it is, 
practically speaking, quite difficult to evaluate these two different types respectively. However, it is 
possible that the change in one factor such as revelation of contingent claim may affect the other, which 
are the activities of hidden expenditure.  
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The above discussion suggests a variety of variables to be considered in the empirical analysis of 
hidden debt. In the next section, we develop a model that places these variables in a unified framework, 
takes account of the key effects involved in the process, and yields a set of testable hypotheses. 
 
2.3 A Simple Model of Hidden Debt 
2.3.1 The Structure of the Model 
 Consider a two-period economy with a continuum of citizens of size one. In period 1, the 
government incurs expenditures that may take four different forms. The first is an explicit public 
expenditure, ݔ, and the second is an implicit or hidden expenditure, ݄. The difference between the two is 
that the former is announced at the start of the period and the government explicitly borrows to cover any 
deficit that it causes, while no information about the total value of the latter is revealed until the end of the 
period. The government arranges its hidden expenditure by making promises to service suppliers or the 
beneficiaries, or by imposing the expenses on some firms or individuals. These arrangements are costly 
and, as a result, each dollar of hidden expenditure yields the same benefit that ߚ dollars of explicit 
expenditure does, where ߚ ൏ 1. We assume that the total value of the two types of expenditure to the 
government is diminishing in its size and can be specified as ߙሺݔ ൅ ߚ݄ሻఊ, where ߙ ൐ 0 and 0 ൏ ߛ ൏ 1. 
The third type of expenditure is the repayment of an existing debt, ܾଵ. Finally, the fourth type of 
expenditure is a contingent liability, ݈, that is realized at the end of the period. ݈ is a random variable 
distributed according to a function, ܨ. ܨሺ∙ሻ is publicly known. The realized value of the liabilities could 
be positive or negative, with ܧሺ݈ሻ ൌ 0.  
The payments for both ܾଵ and ݔ are arranged at the start of the period and financed by a tax, 
ݐଵ, or by explicit borrowing in the credit market. However, the financing of ݄ and ݈ is less voluntary 
and the creditors are either coerced to lend or learn about the expenses imposed on them after the fact.  
Letting the rate of interest for all borrowing be ݎ, the total debt at the start of period 2 will be: 
ܾଶ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሼܾଵ ൅ ݔ െ ݐଵ ൅ ݄ ൅ ݈ሽ. In period 2, the government collects tax, ݐଶ , to repay its debt. 
However, ݐଶ has an upper limit, ݐ̅. As a result, 
ݐଶ ൌ minሼݐ̅, ܾଶሽ 
 Given the limit on repayment, the explicit creditors in period 1 would lend only up to a level that 
they can count on to get back with interest from the government. We assume that such lenders have 
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seniority in the repayment of debt by the government. As a result, the government’s total explicit 
borrowing in period 1, ܾଵ ൅ ݔ െ ݐଵ, is constrained by: 
ሺ2.1ሻ						ܾଵ ൅ ݔ െ ݐଵ ൑ ݐ
̅
1 ൅ ݎ 
 If ܾଶ ൑ ݐ̅, then all lenders, both explicit and implicit, will get their money back. But if ܾଶ ൐ ݐ̅, 
then the implicit lenders will end up with the residual after the explicit lenders have been paid, ݐ̅ െ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሼܾଵ ൅ ݔ െ ݐଵሽ. In this case, the government suffers a cost that is an increasing function of the 
excess debt, ߠܿሺܾଶ െ ݐ̅ሻ , where ܿᇱ ൐ 0 , ܿᇱᇱ ൐ 0 , and ߠ ൐ 0  is a parameter that reflects the 
government’s credibility. A government with a higher credibility, indexed by ߠ, enjoys more favorable 
borrowing conditions because it faces higher costs of repudiating its debt.  
 The probability that the government will not default on its debt is:  
ሺ2.2ሻ				ܲݎሺܾଶ ൑ ݐ̅ሻ ൌ ܲݎ ቈ݈ ൑ ݐ
̅
ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ െ ሺܾଵ ൅ ݔ െ ݐଵ ൅ ݄ሻ቉ ൌ ܨ ቈ
ݐ̅
ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ െ ሺܾଵ ൅ ݔ െ ݐଵ ൅ ݄ሻ቉ 
⟺ ܩሺܾሻ ൌ Prሺܾଶ ൑ ܾሻ ൌ ܨ ൤ ܾሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ െ ሺܾଵ ൅ ݔ െ ݐଵ ൅ ݄ሻ൨ 
 Taxes are distortionary and cause the economy's total income to decline at an increasing rate. Let 
the economy's output in period ݅, ݅ ൌ1, 2, be denoted as ݕ௜ሺݐ௜ሻ, where ݕ௜ᇱ 	൏ 0 and ݕ௜ᇱᇱ ൏ 0. Taxes are 
less than the corresponding output; i.e., ݐ௜ 	൏ 	 ݕ௜ሺݐ௜ሻ. We also assume ݕ௜ᇱ	ሺݐ௜ሻ → 	0 as ݐ௜ → 	0. This 
assumption helps rule out corner solutions that complicate the analysis without changing the main insights 
of the model.  
 The objective function of the government, which is based on the citizens’ welfare function, is: 
ሺ2.3ሻ					ݓሺݔ, ݄, ݐଵ; 	ܾଵሻ ൌ 	ሺݔ ൅ ߚ݄ሻఊ ൅ ݕଵሺݐଵሻ	ݐଵ 	൅ 	ݒሺܾଵ ൅ ݔ െ ݐଵ ൅ ݄ሻ	 
where  is the discount factor for period 2 output and ݒሺܾଵ ൅ ݔ െ ݐଵ ൅ ݄ሻ is the expected utility of the 
government in period 2:  
ሺ2.4ሻ					ݒሺܾଵ ൅ ݔ െ ݐଵ ൅ ݄ሻ ൌ න ሾݕଶሺܾሻ	ܾሿ݂ ൤ ܾሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ െ ሺܾଵ ൅ ݔ െ ݐଵ ൅ ݄ሻ൨
ܾ݀
ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ
௧̅
଴
 
൅න ሾݕଶሺݐ̅ሻ	ݐ̅ െ ߠܿሺܾ െ ݐ̅ሻሿ݂ ൤ ܾሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ െ ሺܾଵ ൅ ݔ െ ݐଵ ൅ ݄ሻ൨
ܾ݀
ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ
ஶ
௧̅
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 First, consider the case where the government’s borrowing constraint in (2.1) is not binding. In 
this situation, the government’s optimal fiscal plan,ሺݔ∗, ݄∗, ݐଵ∗; 	ܾଵሻ, solves the Lagrangian in (2.5) and its 
first order conditions can be described as (2.6)-(2.8):  
ሺ2.5ሻ						ݓሺݔ, ݄, ݐଵ; ܾଵሻ ൅ ߣ ቈܾଵ ൅ ݔ െ ݐଵ െ ݐ
̅
1 ൅ ݎ቉ ൅ ߤ݄, 
ሺ2.6ሻ					 ߲ݓ߲ݐଵ ൌ ݕ
ᇱ
ଵሺݐଵሻ െ 1 െ 	ݒ′ሺܾଵ ൅ ݔ െ ݐଵ ൅ ݄ሻ െ ߣ ൌ 0, 
ሺ2.7ሻ					߲ݓ߲ݔ ൌ ߛሺݔ ൅ ߚ݄ሻఊିଵ ൅ 	ݒ′ሺܾଵ ൅ ݔ െ ݐଵ ൅ ݄ሻ ൅ ߣ ൌ 0, 
ሺ2.8ሻ					߲ݓ߲݄ ൌ ߚߛሺݔ ൅ ߚ݄ሻఊିଵ ൅ 	ݒ′ሺܾଵ ൅ ݔ െ ݐଵ ൅ ݄ሻ ൅ ߤ ൌ 0 
 A quick comparison of (2.7) and (2.8) shows that if constraint (2.1) is not binding and (2.7) 
holds, the first term on the left-hand side of (2.8) must be negative, which means that ߤ ൐ 0. In this case, 
we must have ݄∗ 	ൌ 	0 and ݔ and ݐଵ will be determined by (2.6) and (2.7). The interpretation of the 
above finding is quite straight forward. If a government’s expenditure is small enough and below its 
borrowing limit, then the government does not have any incentive to hide its expenditure because the 
marginal benefit from hiding the expenditure is smaller than making it explicit. Now, let the solution be 
ݐ∗ and ݔ∗. Then we have: 
ሺ2.9ሻ						ߛሺݔ∗ሻఊିଵ ൌ 1 െ ݕᇱଵሺݐ∗ሻ ൌ െ	ݒ′ሺܾଵ ൅ ݔ∗ െ ݐ∗ሻ 
  It implies that the government sets its marginal benefit from explicit expenditure, ߛሺݔ∗ሻఊିଵ, 
equal to its marginal cost in period 1, 1 െ ݕ′ଵሺݐ∗ሻ, and the marginal benefit from optimal expenditure 
should also be equal to the discounted present value of the marginal disutility of taxes in period 2 to pay 
back its debts either partly or fully, െ	ݒ′ሺܾଵ ൅ ݔ∗ െ ݐ∗ሻ. Any factor that raises the marginal value of 
expenditure will raise the government’s preferred spending, ݔ∗ , and taxes in period 1, ݐ∗ , and 
borrowings in period 1, ܾଵ ൅ ݔ∗ െ ݐ∗.  
 Next, consider the case where the constraint in (2.1) binds, then the explicit deficit in period 1, 
݀ ൌ ݔ െ ݐଵ, is such that ݔ∗െݐ∗ ൒ ݀̅ ≡ ௧̅ଵା௥ െ ܾଵ. In this case, ߣ ൐ 0 and ݔ െ ݐଵ must equal ݀̅. Then the 
welfare function in (2.3) can be written:	 
ሺ2.10ሻ				ݓ൫ݐଵ ൅ ݀̅, ݄, ݐଵ; ܾଵ൯ ൌ 	൫ݐଵ ൅ ݀̅ ൅ ߚ݄൯ఊ ൅ ݕଵሺݐଵሻ	ݐଵ ൅ ݒ ቆ ݐ
̅
1 ൅ ݎ ൅ ݄ቇ	 
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 The government’s most preferred fiscal plan under constraint can be summarized as 
ሺ݄∗, ݐଵ∗;	ܾଵሻ, which solves the following FOCs: 
ሺ2.11ሻ		߲ݓ߲ݐଵ ൌ ߛ൫ݐଵ ൅ ݀̅ ൅ ߚ݄൯
ఊିଵ ൅ ݕଵᇱሺݐଵሻ െ 1 ൌ 0, 
ሺ2.12ሻ		߲ݓ߲݄ ൌ ߛߚ൫ݐଵ ൅ ݀̅ ൅ ߚ݄൯
ఊିଵ ൅ ݒ′ ቆ ݐ̅1 ൅ ݎ ൅ ݄ቇ ൌ 0 
 Unlike the previous case, the government has an incentive to hide some of its expenditure, 
݄ ൐ 0. This change is because formal borrowing is not possible anymore and explicit spending is already 
bounded. Under this circumstance the government needs to look for other means of spending that used to 
be ignored because it provides less marginal utility than an explicit one. In particular, the government 
may make an attempt to induce some agents to lend in a way that is not listed on the budget in period 1 
and may not be fully paid back in period 2 if the realization of contingent claim, ݈, is large enough.  
 Second order conditions under constraint can be also described as follows: 
ሺ2.13ሻ		߲
ଶݓ
߲ݐଵଶ
ൌ ݇ ൅ ݕଵᇱᇱሺݐଵሻ ൏ 0, 
ሺ2.14ሻ		߲
ଶݓ
߲݄ଶ ൌ ߚ
ଶ݇ ൅ ݒᇱᇱ ቆ ݐ̅1 ൅ ݎ ൅ ݄ቇ ൏ 0, 
ሺ2.15ሻ		ܵ ൌ ߲
ଶݓ
߲ݐଵଶ
߲ଶݓ
߲݄ଶ െ ቆ
߲ଶݓ
߲݄߲ݐଵቇ
ଶ
ൌ ݇ݒᇱᇱ ቆ ݐ̅1 ൅ ݎ ൅ ݄ቇ ൅ ݕଵᇱᇱሺݐଵሻߚଶ݇ ൅ ݕᇱᇱଵሺݐଵሻݒᇱᇱ ቆ
ݐ̅
1 ൅ ݎ ൅ ݄ቇ ൐ 0, 
where		݇ ൌ ߛሺߛ െ 1ሻ൫ݐଵ ൅ ݀̅ ൅ ߚ݄൯ఊିଶ ൏ 0. 
2.3.2 Comparative Statics 
 In the following, we investigate the characteristics of the equilibrium hidden debt creation when 
government official borrowing is constrained. Let us begin our comparative statics analysis with respect 
to the initial debt, ܾଵ. By differentiating FOCs in (2.11) and (2.12) with respect to ܾଵ, we get: 
ሺ2.16ሻ		݇ ൬߲ݐଵ߲ܾଵ െ 1 ൅ ߚ
߲݄
߲ܾଵ൰ ൅ ݕ
ᇱᇱ
ଵሺݐଵሻ
߲ݐଵ
߲ܾଵ ൌ 0 
ሺ2.17ሻ		ߚ݇ ൬߲ݐଵ߲ܾଵ െ 1 ൅ ߚ
߲݄
߲ܾଵ൰ ൅ ݒ′′ ቆ
ݐ̅
1 ൅ ݎ ൅ ݄ቇ
߲݄
߲ܾଵ ൌ 0 
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 Solve (2.16) and (2.17) for డ௛డ௕భ, then we can get: 
ሺ2.18ሻ		 ߲݄߲ܾଵ ൌ
ݕଵᇱᇱሺݐଵሻ	ߚ݇
ܵ ൐ 0. 
 The positive sign of డ௛డ௕భ follows from the fact that ݕଵ
ᇱᇱሺݐଵሻ ൏ 0, ߚ ൐ 0, ݇ ൏ 0, and ܵ ൐ 0. We 
also know that the denominator is bigger than 0 from SOC in (2.16). Therefore, hidden debt increases 
when the government starts with larger inherited debt, డ௛డ௕భ ൐ 0. The interpretation of this finding is quite 
straight forward. If a government has large pre-existing debt, it needs to spend more resources for the 
repayment of existing debt, ܾଵ rather than making explicit expenditures, which increases government 
payoff. Therefore, a government’s willingness to arrange hidden expenditures increases as existing debt 
increases.8 
 Now, consider how changes in borrowing cost,	ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ, affect the hidden debt. Differentiate 
FOCs with respect to ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ: 
ሺ2.19ሻ				݇ ቆ ߲ݐଵ߲ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ െ
ݐ̅
ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻଶ ൅ ߚ
߲݄
߲ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻቇ ൅ ݕଵ
ᇱᇱሺݐଵሻ ൉ ߲ݐଵ߲ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ ൌ 0 
ሺ2.20ሻ				ߚ݇ ቆ ߲ݐଵ߲ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ െ
ݐ̅
ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻଶ ൅ ߚ
߲݄
߲ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻቇ ൅ ݒ′′ ቆ
ݐ̅
1 ൅ ݎ ൅ ݄ቇ ൉ ቆെ
ݐ̅
ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻଶ ൅
߲݄
߲ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻቇ ൌ 0 
 From (2.19) and (2.20), we can get the following: 
ሺ2.21ሻ			 ߲݄߲ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ ൌ
ܵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻݕଵᇱᇱሺݐଵሻߚ݇
ܵ ൉
ݐ̅
ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻଶ ൐ 0 
 డ௛డሺଵା௥ሻ has a positive sign because of the fact that ݕଵᇱᇱሺݐଵሻ ൏ 0, 0 ൏ ߚ ൐ 1, ݇ ൏ 0, and ܵ ൐ 0. 
We also know that the denominator is bigger than 0 from SOC in (2.16). The positive sign డ௛డሺଵା௥ሻ implies 
that explicit deficit ceiling, ݀̅ ≡ ௧̅ଵା௥ െ ܾଵ, becomes tighter as the interest rate goes up and the explicit 
spending should decrease accordingly. This mechanism makes the government seek more hidden 
expenditure.  
                                                     
8 Even though it is widely believed that the government is more likely to borrow implicitly when it cannot borrow 
explicitly, our analysis reveals that this switching does not happen when utility function is linear. Conditions such as 
substitutability between explicit and implicit spending and diminishing returns are required in order to show that the 
government hides its debt. 
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 Now consider the role of credibility,	ߠ, which measures contract reliability in our model. 
Differentiate FOCs with respect to ߠ: 
ሺ2.22ሻ			݇ ൬߲ݐଵ߲ߠ ൅ ߚ
߲݄
߲ߠ൰ ൅ ݕଵ
ᇱᇱሺݐଵሻ ߲ݐଵ߲ߠ ൌ 0 
ሺ2.23ሻ			ߚ݇ ൬߲ݐଵ߲ߠ ൅ ߚ
߲݄
߲ߠ൰ ൅ ݒ′′ ቆ
ݐ̅
1 ൅ ݎ ൅ ݄ቇ
߲݄
߲ߠ ൅ 
߲ݒ′
߲ߠ ൌ 0 
where			ப௩ᇲபఏ ൌ ׬ ܿሺܾ െ ݐ̅ሻ݂′ ቂ
௕
ଵା௥ െ
௧̅
ଵା௥ െ ݄ቃ
ௗ௕
ሺଵା௥ሻ
ஶ
௧̅  
 From (2.22) and (2.23), we can get: 
ሺ2.24ሻ			߲݄߲ߠ ൌ െ
ሼݕଵᇱᇱሺݐଵሻ ൅ ݇ሽ ߲ݒ
ᇱ
߲ߠ
ܵ ൏ 0 
 Since  ൐ 0,  ݕଵᇱᇱሺݐଵሻ ൅ ݇ ൏ 0 and ܵ ൐ 0, డ௛డఏ will have the same sign as 
డ௩ᇲ
డఏ . In order to 
investigate the sign of  డ௩ᇱడఏ , let ݂ሾ∙ሿ be a bell-shaped symmetrical distribution. Then, it is easy to show 
that డ௩
ᇲ
డఏ ൏ 0 . 9  The interpretation of 
ப௩ᇲ
பఏ ൏ 0  is quite straight forward. Considering that ݒ  is the 
expected utility of the government in period 2, this expected utility will decrease as the government 
suffers from more severe costs when it repudiates debt. Finally, we can show that higher credibility 
reduces incentives to arrange hidden expenditures, i.e.,	డ௛డఏ ൏ 0.  
  
                                                     
9 Since ݂ሾ∙ሿ is symmetric, we know that the value of ݂ᇱሾ∙ሿ  on the right hand side of ߤ has a negative sign while 
it has a positive sign on the left hand side of ߤ with the same absolute values. First, consider the case where ݐ̅ ൐ ߤ. 
Then  ܿሺܾ െ ݐ̅ሻ ൐ 0 holds by the construction ݂ᇱሾ∙ሿ ൏ 0. Therefore, ப௩ᇲபఏ 	has a negative value. Next, suppose that ݐ̅ 
൏ ߤ. Since the cost of repudiate is an increasing function of the excess debt, i.e.,ܿᇱሺܾ െ ݐ̅ሻ ൐ 0, we can find : 
        					ቚ		׬ ܿሺܾ െ ݐ̅ሻ݂′ ቂ ௕ଵା௥ െ
௧̅
ଵା௥ െ ݄ቃ
ௗ௕
ሺଵା௥ሻ
ఓ
ఓିఝୀ௧̅ 		ቚ ൏ ቚ		׬ ܿሺܾ െ ݐ̅ሻ݂ᇱ ቂ ௕ଵା௥ െ
௧̅
ଵା௥ െ ݄ቃ
ௗ௕
ሺଵା௥ሻ		
ఓାఝ
ఓ ቚ 
Therefore, we can show that   
 														ப௩ᇲபఏ ൌ ׬ ܿሺܾ െ ݐ̅ሻ݂
ᇱቂ ್భశೝି
೟ത
భశೝି௛ቃ
೏್
ሺభశೝሻఓఓିఝୀ௧̅ ൅ ׬ ܿሺܾ െ ݐ̅ሻ݂ᇱ ቂ ௕ଵା௥ െ
௧̅
ଵା௥ െ ݄ቃ
ௗ௕
ሺଵା௥ሻ		
ఓାఝ
ఓ  
                       ൅׬ ܿሺܾ െ ݐ̅ሻ݂ᇱ ቂ ௕ଵା௥ െ
௧̅
ଵା௥ െ ݄ቃ
ௗ௕
ሺଵା௥ሻ		
ஶ
ఓାఝ ൏ 0 
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2.4 Empirical Methodology 
 For empirical assessment of the issues related to hidden debt, we build and analyze a country 
panel dataset during 1970 and 2010. This section describes the variables and the details of the empirical 
methodology. 
2.4.1 The Measurement of Hidden Borrowing 
An important part of this methodology is the measurement of hidden debt, which is carried out in 
an indirect way because the nature of hidden public debt makes its direct measurement very difficult. In 
fact, absence of direct measures seems to have been the main impediment for the study of the 
phenomenon in the past. The indicator that we propose consists of the amount of net hidden public 
liabilities that become exposed each year, which is “Stock-Flow Adjustment”(SFA). The conventional 
deficit financing equation can be summarized by the following: 
ܦ݂݁݅ܿ݅ݐ௜௧ ൌ ∆ܦܾ݁ݐ௜௧ ൅ ∆ܯ݋݊݁ݕ௜௧ 
where Debtit is the country's exposed debt at the end of year t,  Deficitit is the gross deficit (primary 
deficit plus interest payments) during year t and Moneyit is the outstanding amount of primary money at 
the end of year t. This equation implies that the budget deficit in this period t should be financed by 
issuing new debt and printing new money in period t. This traditional assumption simply states that the 
government needs to either borrow money from the public or create seigniorage benefits by printing base 
money. Many empirical data, however, show that this rarely holds and the right hand side of the equation 
is usually greater than the left hand side. It implies that the government finances more resources than the 
amount needed for its explicit deficit financing on the budget and the discrepancy needs to be adjusted by 
some factor, SFAt, as follows: 
ܦ݂݁݅ܿ݅ݐ௜௧ ൅ ܵܨܣ௜௧ ൌ ∆ܦܾ݁ݐ௜௧ ൅ ∆ܯ݋݊݁ݕ௜௧ 
 We can assume that this additional financing is used to pay for the extra-budgetary spending that 
has been hidden from the budget but eventually revealed in year ݐ. To some extent, such liabilities are 
natural because it is difficult to predict all contingencies in the budget process, and once they occur, it 
may be easier to just add them to the stock of debt rather than integrating them into the budget. The 
interesting issue is whether the politicians' incentives also play systematic roles in creating or curbing the 
situations that lead to off-budget debt creation.  
 Finally we can derive the revealed hidden debt, which is the net amount of debt revealed each 
year from the stock of hidden government liabilities, as the following: 
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ܵܨܣ௜௧ ൌ ∆ܦܾ݁ݐ௜௧ ൅ ∆ܯ݋݊݁ݕ௜௧ െ ܦ݂݁݅ܿ݅ݐ௜௧ 
where SFAit is the country's revealed hidden debt during year t. Using SFA may seem to have a drawback 
because it reflects the underlying net hidden debt as well as the rate at which such debt is exposed. But 
the combination is an important variable in itself because a critical concern is the destabilizing effects of 
sharp movements in the government's explicit debt exposure. While our study focuses on factors that 
influence the stock of hidden debt, carrying out the analysis through SFA reflects the extent to which those 
factors ultimately affect changes in explicit debt exposure outside the normal budget process. It should be 
pointed out that SFA is likely to have other important applications, especially in the study of fiscal policy. 
Past research in that area has treated deficit figures based on budgetary data as the direct measure of 
public deficit and has equated it with changes in the net amount of debt. That equation needs to be 
reexamined in light of the sizable values that SFA seems to take. 
2.4.2 Overall Behavior of Revealed Hidden Debt 
We measured SFA using the data from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) or the International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS)10.  
The data show that the average SFA has been positive both in the advanced11 and the developing 
countries between 1970 and 2010. We can find that the average SFA of developing countries is larger than 
that of advanced economies throughout most of the time period (Figure 2.1).  It is quite expected 
considering that the developing countries have more incentives to hide debt because of their lack of 
ability to borrow money in the formal financial market and also because of their weak institutional 
features.  In general, SFA of both groups moves in the same direction, but the magnitude is different.   
Figure 2.1 also shows that the SFA of the advanced economies sharply increased in 2008 and dropped back 
again after 2009. Considering that major advanced economies have suffered from financial crisis since 
2008, we can infer that the recent increase in SFA resulted from the extensive support to their financial 
                                                     
10 These datasets are the most common and reliable resources for obtaining cross-country panel data. These datasets, 
however, suffer from inconsistency when comparing before and after the change of accounting method. IMF revised 
its Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) in 2001. After that, only a limited number of countries, which 
are mainly the advanced countries, reported their debt data according to the new method and the debt data of the rest 
of the countries are treated as missing variables in the new GFS dataset. We will discuss more details in the 
empirical analysis section 
11 The classification of advanced countries has been adopted from IMF. IMF categories the following countries as 
advanced economies: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Japan, 
Korea, New Zealand, Norway, San Marino, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. We 
consider the rest of the countries as developing countries.  
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sectors during the crisis. This kind of support cannot be predicted when the budget is prepared and hence 
it drives up the discrepancy between debt and budget deficit and finally leads to an increase in SFA in 
advanced economies.  
 Table 2.1 shows the overall distribution of SFA as a share of GDP between 1970 and 2010.  Our 
dataset contains 1,577 hidden debt observations from 82 countries. Out of 1,577 total observations, 719 
observations are from the 29 advanced countries while 856 observations are from the 53 developing 
countries. Table 2.1 verifies that the average SFA of developing countries, 6.18% of GDP, is larger than 
that of advanced countries, 3.90% of GDP. Also, the mean of SFA is larger than the median both in 
advanced and developing countries. It supports the existence of large outliers in the dataset. Some 
countries have negative hidden debt, which can be interpreted as hidden assets in lower percentiles such 
as the 10% percentile. SFA can be negative because governments have assets as well as debts that are not 
reflected in their accounts. Such assets can generate revenues or sales proceeds that help retire explicit 
debt without entering the budget process. 
Figure 2.2 presents the distribution of SFA over time for our (panel) sample. Note that Figure 2.2 
shows that the variance of SFA has clearly increased since the mid-1980s. This seems to reflect the 
increased uncertainty in the world economic environment associated with globalization. It should be 
pointed out that the data shown in Figure 2.2 excludes several observations, mostly from Israel during 
1977 and 1985, which were 1-4 times bigger than GDP and seemed to be clear outliers. However, we do 
not exclude those observations from our analysis because the variables may contain country specific 
issues and the econometric method, “quantile” regression, is robust to the outliers.  
 To further examine the properties of SFA, in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 we present its scatter diagrams 
against the logs of per capita GDP and 1+debt/GDP. Figure 2.3 shows that there is some tendency for lower 
income countries to have larger SFAs. However, the tendency is weak and, in fact, econometrically 
undetectable once we control for the factors identified by the theoretical model. Figure 2.4 shows that 
there is a wider dispersion of SFA as debt-GDP ratio goes up. We will discuss the relationship between SFA 
and debt-GDP ratio by using model and econometric work.  
 To be able to use the model of section 2.3 for analyzing SFA, we need to make some assumptions 
about the rate at which hidden debt becomes exposed. If the rate of revelation were independent of the 
determinants of the stock of hidden debt, then we could ignore that factor altogether. However, this is 
unlikely to be the case. In fact, it is likely that the factors that raise hidden debt tend to slow down its 
revelation as well. To overcome the consequences of this problem, we assume that the effects of the 
determinants of the stock of hidden debt on the revelation rate of the debt do not completely counteract 
the effects of those determinants on the stock itself. In other words, we assume that the net effects of 
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those factors on SFA are in the same direction as the ones on the stock of debt. This allows us to proceed 
with the examination of the determinants of SFA based on the theoretical insights of section 2.3. Since the 
variations in the rate of revelation are likely to dampen the effects on the stock, if empirical results from 
the study of SFA agree with our hypotheses concerning the stock of hidden debt, we can interpret them as 
strongly favorable evidence. In the rest of this section, we lay out our empirical methodology for testing 
the model based on this approach. To ensure that SFA is comparable across countries, we scale it by its 
corresponding GDP.  
2.4.3  The Explanatory Variables and Operational Hypotheses 
To test the results obtained in section 2.3, we need to specify the actual variables that can proxy 
for the parameters of the model and, then, examine their relationships with SFA. Let us start with the 
proxies for the cost of default,	ߠ. Considering that the countries with strong credibility are more likely to 
experience bigger costs when they repudiate their debt, ߠ can also be interpreted as the index for the 
credibility. The variable that we consider for this purpose is the "contract viability" and “contract 
repudiation” indexes available from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset (see Knack and 
Keefer, 1995).12 These indexes measures risks of modification in contracts in the form of cancellation or 
outright expropriation. Since ICRG provides "contract viability" from 2001, we used “contract 
repudiation” for the previous years and rescale the range between 0 and 10, with higher scores indicating 
lower risks which translate into higher levels of ߠ. To reflect the improvement in institutional quality 
associated with higher values of this index, we will refer to it as contract reliability. Our hypothesis is that 
the contract reliability is negatively related to SFA. It is possible that lacking credibility in contracting 
may also raise the cost of arranging hidden debt and result in the opposite effect. However, the contract 
reliability index reflects situations concerning formal and explicit contracts, while disguised debt deals 
are often arranged through informal relationships, which seem to be more readily available in 
environments where formal contracts are less reliable. For this reason, we expect the stated hypothesis to 
hold. In any event, if the impact of contract reliability on the cost of hidden loans is in fact large and the 
data still shows a negative relationship between that variable and SFA, the result should be taken as even a 
stronger support for the hypothesis concerning the role of factors that tighten the explicit borrowing 
constraint by lowering the borrowing limit.  
                                                     
12 The ICRG dataset is available from the early 1980s. To take advantage of a longer time span, we extrapolated this 
data to the early 1970s with the help of another data set, BERI, which offers similar indicators, though for a more 
limited number of countries. 
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Now consider the variables that affect the tightness of the constraint on explicit borrowing, ݀̅. 
The initial level of exposed public debt as a percentage of GDP,	ܾଵ, should reduce ݀̅. Other things being 
equal, a more indebted government is likely to have less to offer by way of debt repayment in the future 
and, thus, face a tighter debt limit in the formal credit markets. This should increase the politicians' 
incentive to seek hidden debt. Therefore, SFA is expected to be positively related to the debt-GDP ratio. In 
the regression, we used the lagged value of debt-GDP ratio.  
 The interest rate may also affect the level of hidden debt, however, its effect is ambiguous 
according to our model. First, as the interest rate goes up, the governments need to spend a larger portion 
of their borrowing for repaying debt, reducing resources available for explicit government spending. On 
the other hand, if the interest rate goes up, the government needs to pay higher interest both on explicit 
and implicit loans eventually, and it may give incentive to reduce government expenditures, including 
hidden ones. Finally, the net effect of the interest rate on hidden debt is determined by the magnitude of 
the above two different forces. As an instrument for the interest rate, we use the deposit interest rate from 
WDI.  
A banking crisis may affect the probability of realization of contingent liability,	ܨሾ∙ሿ, and 
eventually change the size of SFA. Laeven and Valencia (2012) constructed a database that includes all 
banking crisis dates, costs, and policy responses during the period 1970-2010.  Based on this information, 
we create a dummy which is equal to 1 if the country is under a banking crisis. We can assume that the 
country under a banking crisis experiences difficulties in financing resources by issuing bonds due to the 
freezing of the financial system. If a banking crisis hits the economy, then it shifts the probability of 
sudden realization of contingent liability and we should observe SFA rising during a banking crisis. 
Now consider the variables that represent the value of public expenditure, ߙ. Though it is not 
easy to find measures across countries, the degree of openness that affects the demand for public 
expenditure as a source of social insurance can be used as a proxy (Rodrik, 1998). If this is indeed the 
case, openness should be positively related to SFA.13 We measure openness by the share of imports plus 
exports in GDP from the WDI database.  Proportional Representative Systems (PR), in the electoral rule, 
may also affect the demand for public expenditure. There is a wide consensus that PR is likely to increase 
                                                     
13 It is possible that the greater access to international capital markets in more open economies may lead to less need 
for hidden debt. This effect would tend to dampen the positive impact of openness on hidding debt through 
increased demand for public expenditure. Thus, if we observe a significant positive coefficient for openness, it 
would confirm the strength of the latter effect. 
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government spending and run larger deficits compare to plurality states because PR systems often lead to 
coalition governments among several minor parties, and governments are less decisive to discourage the 
demands of extreme parties (Roubini and Sachs 1989; Alesina and Tabellini 1990; Hallerberg and Von 
Hagen, 1999). We acquire proportional representative information from DBPI. The proportional 
representative system dummy has a value of 1 if politicians are elected based on the percent of votes 
received by their party.  
Transparency in the government sector may affect the level of hidden expenditure. It is generally 
believed that the cost of arranging disguised expenditure increases as the government becomes more 
transparent. However, for empirical analysis, acquiring data sources that provide the long run trend of 
transparency is difficult. Several institutions have investigated the transparency level of a country, but 
they measure the transparency only one time or only across a very limited time period. To detect the 
latent characteristics of transparency, we use the data missing patterns in the World Bank's World 
Development Indicators (WDI). WDI provides various country level statistics but one can easily notice that 
some countries have more missing points than others across a wide range of indicators and that some 
indicators tend to be missing more so than other indicators across country-years. The missing values in 
WDI indicate that the government was either unable or unwilling to provide reliable information on the 
state of the country. Therefore, we can assume that a larger number of empty values means a lower level 
of transparency (Kim, 2008; Rosendorff and Vreeland, 2006). For our analysis, the number of missing 
values is calculated similarly to Kim (2008).    
Finally, we also added a measure of inflation, though there is no clear theory of the effect of 
inflation on hidden debt. If a country can generate inflation, it decreases the value of existing liability and 
also possibly reduces the incentive for the politicians to hide debt. We adopted Consumer Price Indexes 
(CPI) from WDI for the analysis.  
 
2.5 Empirical Results 
2.5.1  The Econometric Model 
To test empirically the above hypotheses, we used regression with country fixed effects and time 
fixed effects. As we already saw in Figure 2.1, there are time-varying biases in SFA and time-fixed effects 
have been added to control for any time-varying biases that are common across all countries. The 
structure of the model is the following: 
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(2.25)  ܪ௜௧ ൌ ௜ܺ௧ᇱ ∙ ߙሺ߬ሻ ൅ ௜ሺ߬ሻ ൅ ߠ௧ሺ߬ሻ ൅ ߝ௜௧ሺ߬ሻ 
where ௜ܺ௧ᇱ  is the set of determinants of hidden debt (discussed in the previous subsection), ߙሺ߬ሻ 
is the vector of coefficients at ߬ th percentile of distribution, ௜ሺ߬ሻ is a country fixed effect and	ߠ௧ሺ߬ሻ is 
a time fixed effect. ߝ௜௧ሺ߬ሻ  is a random variable whose ߬ th quantile is zero: ܳఌሺ߬ሻ ൌ 0 . The 
bootstrapping method has been applied to calculate standard errors. Since the introduction of a large 
number of fixed effects can inflate the variability of estimates of other covariate effects, these individual 
effects have been penalized by shrinking toward zero, a method proposed by Koenker (2004)14. 
The econometric method that we use for estimating (2.25) is a quantile regression with fixed 
effects for panel dataset (Koenker, 2004). Quantile regression has several advantages in analyzing the 
determinants of SFA. Quantile regression is a statistical technique intended to estimate, and conduct 
inferences about, the conditional median or other percentiles of the response variable while classical 
linear regression methods are based on minimizing sums of squared residuals. Owing to this nature of 
quantile regression, we can investigate how explanatory variables differently influence the SFA at each 
quantile of the conditional distribution. For example, it is possible to estimate whether debt to GDP alters 
the hidden debt of a country with a high level in the same way that the country under a low level of 
hidden debt is affected. It turns out to be a huge advantage considering that the classical least square 
method assumes that covariate effects shift the entire distribution by a fixed amount in all regions.  
Another advantage is that the quantile regression estimates are more robust against outliers in the 
response measurements than ordinary least square regression. Some SFA observations calculated by using 
the GFM dataset show unreasonably large values, and this may be caused by the lack of accounting 
techniques or unknown country specific issues. Therefore, it may be misleading to drop outliers just 
because of their largeness. However, once they are included in the least square regression, the regression 
estimates can be heavily affected by the outliers. Quantile regression can reduce the outlier problem 
because it cares about the rank of the observation, not the values of the observation itself, so we can add 
the outliers into our regression with fewer concerns about robustness issues.   
2.5.2  Summary of Empirical Analysis 
Figure 2.5 reports our main results. The first column in Figure 2.5 shows the outcome of quantile 
regression estimation of equation (2.25) with respect to cash based SFA. The next column shows the 
regression outcomes of accrual based SFA. For all regressions, a country fixed effect and year fixed effect 
                                                     
14 For statistical analysis of quantile regression for panel data, R package “rqpd” has been employed. 
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have been introduced to control the country characteristics and year trends. A quick comparison of the 
two columns shows that addressing simultaneity and measurement matters for the size of the estimated 
coefficients and their significance levels.  
First, let us consider the cash based hidden debt case. Theory predicts that the debt-GDP ratio is 
positively related to SFA, and the empirical analysis supports this prediction. The coefficient of lagged 
debt-GDP ratio has a positive sign and its magnitude becomes stronger as it moves toward the upper end 
of distribution. It indicates that the countries in the upper tail of distribution, i.e., countries already having 
a large stock of hidden debt, are likely to incur larger hidden debt when debt-GDP ratio increases.  
Let us now consider the indexes related to , which is the value of public expenditure. Our 
explanation for this effect is that openness raises the demand for public expenditure as a means of social 
insurance. Lagged openness of the economy pushes up the level of hidden debt and the magnitude of 
openness on the level of hidden debt is larger when the country has more hidden debt.  
The estimated coefficients for the contract reliability, which is a proxy for the ability to ensure 
the payment of explicit debt, have a negative sign. It implies that the countries with low risk of ex-post 
modification in government contracts can access credit markets easily and have less incentive to seek 
hidden debt. Therefore, the sign of the index is expected to be negative. The regression outcome shows 
that the coefficient of the lagged contract reliability index is significantly negative in general. 
Furthermore, the absolute value of the coefficients gets bigger as one moves to the upper end of 
distribution. It indicates that contract reliability has more power to decrease the level of hidden debt, 
especially in the countries that have a larger level of hidden debt. 
It turns out that a proportional representative system induces more hidden debt. It is quite 
expected considering that a proportional representative system increases the possibility of the emergence 
of minor parties and a coalition government and possibly increases the size of government expenditure.  
Regression also shows that the cost of funds also matters in determining the level of hidden debt. 
As the interest rate goes up, the countries are more likely to hide debt. Furthermore, if the country has 
more hidden debt, then hidden debt increases more sharply as the interest rate increases. 
Inflation has exactly the opposite effect. It seems to reduce the hidden debt. A possible 
explanation is that countries that are able to create inflation do not need to hide debt. Inflation reduces the 
cost of borrowing and countries do not need to hide their debt.  
55 
 
The banking crisis dummies also play an import role in determining the level of hidden debt. 
These dummies reflect an unexpected government spending increase or the sudden realization of implicit 
guarantees by the government on financial sectors. For the first year of a banking sector crisis, the 
banking crisis dummy basically influences the upper end of the distribution. When the country has a 
banking crisis, it typically pushes up the level of hidden debt at the upper end of  distribution. By the 
nature of crisis, a banking crisis causes the revelation of a great deal of hidden debt. One interesting 
observation is about the years after the first year.  In the following years, there is a correction of the 
sudden revelation of hidden debt in the first year and hidden debt levels become lower or negative hidden 
debt.  
Opaqueness of a country, which is measured by the missing values in WDI, turns out to be 
positively correlated to hidden debt. This relationship indicates that the countries with a lower level of 
transparency in their government system are more likely to pursue hidden debt.  
Now let us consider the determinants of hidden debt under accrual accounting. The general result 
is that for the countries with accrual accounting, the effect of several determinants becomes milder and 
less significant. Variables such as inflation, openness, and opaqueness do not turn out to be significant in 
explaining the behavior of accrual based hidden debt.  
The debt-GDP ratio pushes up the hidden debt at the upper percentile of distribution. One 
interesting observation is that debt-GDP ratio has a negative impact on hidden debt in the lower tail of 
distribution. Considering that hidden debt in the lower-end usually has a negative sign, which means 
hidden assets, we may explain that countries sell their assets and the revenues from sales of these assets 
reduce the liabilities. We may expect that this money movement is captured more easily under accrual 
bases. 
Deposit interest rate basically does not have much impact on the level of hidden debt, but it has a 
possibly positive relationship with hidden debt at the higher end of distribution. Proportional 
representation system has a positive sign at the upper tail of distribution but its significance is only visible 
in the middle rage. Banking sector crisis again increases the level of hidden debt during the first year and 
has a negative effect in the following years for all corresponding quantile. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 Government budgets are highly complex and difficult to track. Politicians are also often reluctant 
to make government accounts transparent, either because it is difficult for them to do so or because they 
prefer to shield part of their activities from public scrutiny. These factors give rise to hidden liabilities that 
sometimes come to undermine fiscal and macroeconomic performance. Understanding the factors that 
increase or decrease off-budget liabilities or their exposure rates is important for designing preventive 
measures and for enhancing transparency and predictability in government finances around the world. 
The theoretical and empirical analysis of this paper offers important insights in this regard.  
Our results show that stock-flow adjustment (SFA) is not just a simple random element but, rather, 
systematically related to the country specific institutional and economic conditions. Factors that make 
public borrowing difficult, such as a larger debt level and higher borrowing cost or an increase in the 
demand for public spending such as through vulnerability to external shock, induce politicians to resort to 
hiding debt. If a country has a weak institution, a politician’s desires are easy to implement, and it allows 
politicians to use hidden debt more easily. Our regression, however, finds that certain institutional 
characteristics discourage politicians’ willingness to arrange for hidden expenditures because it becomes 
more costly to hide the debt. Credibility measured by the contract reliability index, opaqueness in the 
government sector, and the structure of the legislative body significantly influences the size of SFA under 
cash based accounting. The switch to accrual accounting from cash based accounting has helped reduce 
SFA and most factors have milder effects in explaining the SFA under accrual accounting. Changes in 
accounting method, however, do not remove all the adverse effects of a weak institution. Contract 
reliability turns out to have a consistently significant effect on hidden debt both in cash and accrual based 
accounting. We can see a very stable relationship that shows that improvement in contract reliability 
reduces the level of hidden debt and that this effect becomes stronger in the upper tail of distribution. 
Considering that other variables become less significant in accrual base, the level of hidden debt largely 
boils down to the credibility issue. Overall, accrual based accounting seems to be helpful in reducing 
hidden debt, but countries that are not reliable in keeping contracts may run hidden debts even under 
accrual based accounting. 
In terms of econometric method we adopt the quantile regression method to help us verify how 
explanatory variables differently alter the hidden debt of a country with a high level of hidden debt in the 
same way that the country with a low level of hidden debt is affected. We can verify that the magnitude of 
variables on hidden debt is different based on the existing level of hidden debt. For example, contract 
reliability has a small impact on the lower end of distribution, but it becomes larger in the upper 
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percentiles. Furthermore, we can separate the effect of explanatory variables where a country has hidden 
assets, which means a negative value of SFA. For example, the coefficient of debt to GDP ratio has a 
negative sign in the lower percentile of distribution when we measure the SFA using accrual basis. We 
might be able to say that the country may sell assets when it has hidden assets.    
Lastly, it is worth noting that the conformity of the various effects derived from our theoretical 
framework with the estimation results offers support for the usefulness of SFA as a proxy for hidden public 
spending. The regressions show that this indicator is capable of generating meaningful results that help 
disentangle a variety of effects on hidden debt. The concept can also be useful for improving research on 
fiscal policy by highlighting the difference between the budgetary deficit and the actual deficit that a 
government runs. However, more work needs to be done to separate the hidden expenditure out from  
SFA, which includes both hidden expenditures and contingent liability. There is also a clear need to collect 
information about the specifics of budget procedures that influence the costs and benefits of hidden debt. 
Identifying such factors and documenting their roles can play an important part in offering lessons for 
practical policy steps that help improve budget discipline.  
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Chapter 2  Tables and Figures 
 
Table 2.1 The Distribution of Stock-Flow Adjustment, 1970–2010 
(as % of GDP) 
Group 
Mean 
(St.dev) 
Percentile # of 
Obs 
# of 
Countries 10% 25% 50% (Median) 75% 90% 
All 
Countries 
5.1413 
(7.7023) 
-.938 .880 3.392 7.059 13.921 1,577 82 
Advanced 
Countries 
3.9013 
(6.8413) 
-1.135 .372 2.162 5.212 12.285 719 29 
Developing 
Countries 
6.1804 
(8.2167) 
-.551 1.642 4.566 8.156 14.852 858 53 
 Source: Calculated based on IMF GFS data. Several observations in which SFA is larger than 60% 
of GDP are excluded from the calculations. 
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Figure 2.1 Stock-Flow Adjustment of Advanced and Developing Economies 
 
  Source: Calculated based on IMF GFS data. 
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Figure 2.2 Stock-Flow Adjustment Over Time
 
 Source: Calculated based on IMF GFS data.  
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Figure 2.3 Revealed Hidden Debt vs. Real Per Capita GDP 
 
 Source: Calculated based on IMF GFS data.  
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Figure 2.4 Revealed Hidden Debt vs. Debt-GDP Ratio 
 
 Source: Calculated based on IMF GFS data.  
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Figure 2.5 Quantile Regression Plots 
(Dependent Variable) Stock Flow Adjustment to GDP, % 
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Figure 2.5 (cont.) 
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Figure 2.5 (cont.) 
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Figure 2.5 (cont.) 
 
List of Countries 
Cash base(54): Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican 
Republic, Ethiopia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Korea, 
Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Papua 
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe 
 
Non-Cash base(36): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, 
Madagascar, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovak, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom 
   
67 
 
CHAPTER 3 
The Role of Budget Institutions in Emerging Market Credit Spreads 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This study examines the role of budget institutions in credit spreads of emerging market countries’ 
sovereign bonds. The credit spread, i.e. interest difference between a country’s bond and a risk-free 
sovereign bond, reflect the default risk evaluated by investors. Therefore, a country with higher default 
risk faces wider credit spreads because investors want to receive a higher interest benefit to compensate 
for the possible losses from holding risky assets. In accessing a country’s default risk, investors take into 
account the risk characteristics at that time and there can be many possible determinates of credit spreads. 
Some researchers find that global financial market conditions such as investor’s risk appetite and global 
liquidity are important determinants of yield spreads (Dungey et al., 2001; González‐Rozada and Yeyati, 
2008). On the other hand, other researchers emphasize country-specific factors such as political and fiscal 
factors as determinants of credit risk in emerging markets (Baldacci et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
considering that risk premia is about the possible default of sovereign bonds, the fiscal shape of a country 
may also influence the credit spread. An increase in public debt signals a weakening of fiscal prudence 
and investors punish this country by charging higher interest rates.  However, this may be mitigated by 
strong fiscal institutions. The effect of budget institutions on spreads may be explained by the “common 
pool” problem. The traditional “common pool” framework suggests that excessive public spending is 
caused when the participants do not incur the full cost and may want to over-extract resources from the 
budget. This common pool spending bias should be lower in countries with better fiscal institutions 
(Gleich, 2003) and robust institutions should strengthen the credibility of government promises about 
future fiscal behavior (Hallerberg and Wolff, 2008). Finally, market participants should also recognize 
this and investor bond prices will be less dependent on annual fiscal behavior of a country.  
The contributions of this study to the existing literature are twofold. First, this study examines the 
effect of budget institutions on sovereign interest rate spreads in emerging markets. Although there is a 
pioneering work that studies the role of fiscal institutions on credit spreads among Euro zone countries 
(Hallerberg and Wolff, 2008), no attempts have been made in the area of emerging markets, to the best of 
our knowledge. Emerging economies tend to have larger variances in budgets and political institutions 
and are considered more vulnerable to external shocks compared to the developed Euro zone countries. 
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Therefore, the effectiveness of fiscal and political institutions may play more important roles in 
determining the credit risk premia in developing economies. Next as an econometric tool, we adopt 
quantile regression that has several advantages in analyzing the determinants of credit spreads over 
classical least square estimation. One advantage is that the quantile regression estimates are more robust 
against outliers that can be often observed in financial market data than ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression. Another important advantage of quantile regression is that we can investigate how explanatory 
variables differently influence the risk premia among different regions. This turns out to be a huge 
advantage, considering that classical least square regression assumes covariate effects shift the entire 
distribution by a fixed amount in all regions.  
To estimate the determinants of yield spreads in emerging markets, we construct a panel dataset 
of 24 developing countries. The dependent variable that is a measure for credit spreads in this study is the 
Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) from JP Morgan. The first set of explanatory variables of interest is 
the level of public debt. Considering that yield spreads reflect the default possibility of a country, the 
spreads are expected to increase with weakening fiscal soundness such as raising debt. The next group of 
explanatory variables is the possible determinants of emerging market credit spreads. We investigate 
whether budget discipline and credibility have negative relationships with spreads. Better institutions and 
reputations may decrease the uncertainty over honoring debt and possibly lower risk premia. We can also 
expect that a larger international reserve in a country will decrease the default risk over foreign currency 
debt and hence reduce credit spreads in emerging markets. The third group of variables is the 
international financial market situation such as investor’s risk appetite and global liquidity. To control for 
the evolution of international financial markets, we add time fixed effects because these global factors are 
commonly affect all the countries for a certain time.    
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews previous literature. 
Section 3.3 provides information about the data including the sources and the overall description of key 
variables. Section 3.4 describes the empirical method and presents the results of our empirical analysis 
and section 3.5 provides some overall conclusions. 
 
3.2 Existing Literature 
Financial market globalization lowers the barriers related to the in and out flows of capital and 
increases the opportunities for emerging market countries to borrow money on the international financial 
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markets by issuing foreign currency bonds. International bankers charge higher interest compared to the 
risk-free countries because investments in risky bonds have a certain probability of default and the 
bankers want to compensate for this expected loss with higher interest rates. Therefore, theoretically the 
yield spreads between risk-free countries and emerging markets reflect the expected probability of 
default.  
In the area of empirical analysis, there have been a lot of efforts to explain the determinants of the 
spreads. Empirical research on the credit spreads can be largely divided into two groups. The first group 
of studies emphasizes the role of global factors in explaining the emerging market risk spreads while the 
other group focuses on the role of country-specific economic factors.  
Many studies shed light on the importance of global market conditions as determinants of credit 
spreads both in emerging markets and advanced economies. Eichengreen and Mody (1998) finds that 
changes in spreads were dominated more by sharp adverse shifts in market sentiment than by changes in 
fundamentals. They collect data on nearly 1,000 developing-country bonds issued in 1991 to 1996 and 
find that changes in observable issuer characteristics and the responsiveness of spreads do not provide an 
adequate explanation for changes over time in the value of new bond issues and launch spreads. However, 
they claim that in important periods, such as the wake of the Mexican crisis, blanket shifts in sentiment 
play a dominant role. González‐Rozada and Yeyati (2008) construct a panel dataset of 33 emerging 
economies and show that a large fraction of the time variability of emerging market bond spreads is 
explained by the evolution of global factors such as risk appetite, global liquidity and contagion from 
systemic events such as the Russian default. Dungey et al. (2001) analyze the determinants of long-term 
bond spreads in five advanced economies - Australia, Japan, Germany, Canada and the UK - over 1991 to 
1999. They decompose the interest rate spreads into national and global factors and find that spreads are 
mainly determined by common international factors such as investors’ general risk aversion.  
Another stream of the literature has tried to investigate whether country specific characteristics 
derive any changes in country risk premiums. As a pioneering effort, Edwards (1986) analyzes the 
determination of country risk premia both in the bank loan and sovereign bonds of emerging markets.  
They find that debt is positively correlated while reserves are negatively correlated with the risk premia of 
a country.  Using data on yields for Mexican and Brazilian sovereign bonds, they also find that the major 
turning points in these spreads were related to major economic or political events in these countries. 
Bernoth et al. (2012) emphasizes the role of fiscal performance. They show that yield spreads respond 
significantly to measures of government indebtedness, both before and after the start of the Economic and 
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Monetary Union (EMU). Interestingly, they also find that after the start of the EMU, markets seem to pay 
less attention to government debt levels than they did before. They explain that this result may reflect that 
public debates about the fiscal performance of EMU countries have generally focused on deficits and have 
disregarded debt ratios since 1999. Akitoby and Stratmann (2008) examine the effects of fiscal policy on 
sovereign risk spreads and show debt-financed spending using panel data from emerging market countries. 
They find that higher public debt levels result in wider spreads as markets perceive the potential 
unsustainable pace of fiscal policy, while tax-based spending lowers spreads. Ul Haque et al. (1996) 
analyze the determinants of creditworthiness indicators for over 60 developing countries. Their results 
indicate that economic fundamentals like the ratio of non-gold foreign exchange reserves to imports, 
growth, and inflation explain a large amount of the variation in the credit ratings constructed by three 
credit rating institutions: Euromoney, Economist Intelligence Unit, and Institutional Investor. 
Furthermore, they find that country ratings were adversely affected by an increase in international interest 
rates, independent of the domestic economic fundamentals.  
However, the role of credit rating is rather controversial. González‐Rozada and Yeyati (2008) 
conclude that ratings appear to be largely endogenous, reflecting changes in spreads rather than anticipating 
them. Indeed, a closer look reveals that credit rating or outlook changes lag spread movements and elicit 
little (if any) additional effect on spreads. Rowland and Torres (2004) show that creditworthiness, as 
measured by Institutional Investor’s Creditworthiness Index that is quite similar to the credit ratings from 
Standard and Poor’s or Moody’s, is also a key determinant for emerging market sovereign debt cost. 
Credit rating indicators are in turn found to be influenced by macroeconomic fundamentals. 
Recently, some researchers investigate the role of political institutions in financial markets. 
Akitoby and Stratmann (2010) show that improvements in democratic rights and increased government 
accountability lower sovereign spreads, using a panel of emerging market economies. They also show that   
debt levels and international reserves are significant factors in determining spreads. Baldacci et al. (2011) 
show that country-specific political and fiscal factors affect credit risk in emerging markets. Higher levels 
of political risk are associated with wider credit spreads because poor political stability and weak 
institutions of a country may signal to the markets a lack of commitment to sound economic policies. They 
also find that high debt and deficits leads to an increase in credit spreads, implying again that the fiscal 
position matters as highly indebted countries are penalized by international capital markets. Ciocchini et al. 
(2003) investigate how corruption is related to the spreads in the emerging markets. They showed that 
governments and firms in more corrupt countries have to pay higher spreads because corruption limits the 
government’s ability to meet debt obligations and therefore increases default risk.  
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Budget institutions can be a potential factor that determines credit spreads of a country because 
the governments with better budget institutions are more likely to maintain fiscal soundness in the long 
run and it may lead to lower yield spreads. Despite the importance of budget institutions, only a limited 
number of studies have investigated the role of political factors in financial markets and the existing 
pioneering works are limited to European countries. Hallerberg and Wolff (2008) show that fiscal policy 
remains a significant determinant of risk premia in EMU countries. Individual country deficits should be 
less important in countries with better institutions, as financial markets believe that they are not driven by 
a systematic bias but rather reflect temporary effects. However, to the best of our knowledge, no attempt 
has been made regarding the role of budget institutions in interest spreads in the area of emerging market 
economies.  
Emerging economies tend to have larger variances in budgets and political institutions and are 
considered more vulnerable to external shocks compared to the developed countries in the Euro zone. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of fiscal and political institutions may play more important roles in 
determining the credit risk premia in developing economies. 
 
3.3 Data Set and Overview of Data 
3.3.1 Overview of the data 
This section presents a general description regarding the movement of sovereign bond spreads. As 
a measure of credit spread, we use the Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) 15 calculated by JP Morgan 
of 21 emerging market countries. The period may vary based on the data availability.  
Figure 3.1 describes the overall trend in the EMBI composite index. It shows that there was a 
downward trend in bond spreads during the 2000s decade before the financial crisis in 2008. This trend 
suggests the existence of strong global factors. The global financial market situation including investors’ 
risk appetite and liquidity have been pointed as important determinants of credit spreads (Dungey et al., 
2001, González‐Rozada and Yeyati, 2008).  Figure 3.1 depicts proxy investors’ risk appetite by Market 
Volatility Index (VIX) from the Chicago Board Options Exchange. VIX has been considered as a key 
measure for investors’ sentiment and market volatility. A higher VIX index implies that investors expect 
the market volatility will increase.  The evolution of global liquidity has been proxied by the real 
international interest rate (LIBOR). The LHS graph in Figure 3.1 shows the strong co-movement between 
                                                     
15 We use the quarterly averaged EMBI index compiled by Global Financial Data (www.globalfinancialdata.com). 
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the EMBI index and VIX.  It implies that investors’ risk appetite is a key determinant of emerging 
market spreads. The RHS graph provides the visual relationship between EMBI and real LIBOR.  Again, 
EMBI is closely correlated to LIBOR, which is a proxy for global liquidity, but the correlation became 
loose in 2006 and 2007. We can infer that the market kept an optimistic view and invested in emerging 
market sovereign bonds in spite of monetary tightening in 2006 and 2007. 
Previous literature has shown that debt to GDP ratio is negatively related to credit spreads 
(Edwards, 1984; Hanson, 1974; Harberger, 1980; Sachs, 1984). This relationship is not difficult to find in 
our dataset. Figure 3.2 shows the relationship between public debt and credit spreads. The basic 
conclusion is that fiscal performance is closely related to the risk premia. In other words, fiscal 
deterioration such as an increase in public debt also increases the risk of default and, hence, raises the 
borrowing cost of a country.  
3.3.2 Data Set and Key Variables 
The dataset used for estimation consists of country level panel data for 21 emerging market 
countries16 during 1995 and 2010. The limit on the number of countries and observations is set by the 
availability of consistent data for the relevant variables, particularly information on EMBI credit spreads, 
government debt as a percentage of GDP and fiscal discipline index data.  
Public debt data are obtained from IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO). Collecting fiscal 
performance data is not an easy task due to the recent change in accounting methods of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The most common way to get cross-country panel government financial data is to 
use the International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics (IFS) or International Monetary Fund 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS). These datasets, however, suffer from the inconsistency of before and 
after the change of accounting methods. IMF revised its Government Finance Statistics Manual in 2001. 
After that, only a limited number of countries, which are mainly the advanced countries, reported their debt 
data according to this new method; the debt data of the rest of the countries are treated as missing variables 
in the new GFS dataset. Due to the difficulty of collecting raw data from IFS and GFS, we used the 
government financial statistics from IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO). WEO database provides the 
debt data of various advanced and emerging countries after 1982. 
                                                     
16 List of countries (21): Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, 
Venezuela 
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Given the adverse effect of debt to GDP ratio on a country’s ability to honor its existing debt, we 
can expect that the fiscal discipline to mitigate the widening of spreads from increasing public debt 
because robust fiscal institutions should strengthen the credibility of government promises about future 
fiscal behavior (Hallerberg and Wolff, 2008). To test the significance of fiscal institutions, we include the 
interaction of debt-GDP ratio with the indicator of Fiscal Discipline Index and expect that the coefficient 
of interaction term has a negative sign. However, there is no single source with a consistent indicator 
covering a large number of countries with respect to the measurement of fiscal discipline. To ensure that 
the regressions are based on data with sufficient cross-country variation, I use the common denominator of 
all available regional data on budget institutions to construct a common index for them. These studies and 
their regional focuses are as follows:  
Central and Eastern Europe - Gleich (2003). 
Western Europe - Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2001). 
Latin America - Alesina et al. (1999). 
Middle East and North Africa - Esfahani (2001). 
South and East Asia - Lao-Araya (1998).  
Among these studies, the budget institutions index developed by Alesina et al. (1999) is based on 
the least amount of information, while the indices constructed by Esfahani (2001) and Hallerberg, Strauch, 
and von Hagen (2001) are most data intensive.  Lao-Araya (1998) and Gleich (2003) use simpler versions 
of the latter study's index. For building a broad cross-country index, I adopt the methodology of Alesina et 
al. (1999) and apply it to the countries covered by the other four studies. For some of these countries, the 
data provided by the studies needed to be supplemented by examining other sources, which was done by 
consulting the relevant IMF, World Bank or other publications. This approach ensured the largest set of 
countries in the database. The more detailed methods adopted in the other studies yield indices that 
incorporate more information about fiscal policy institutions. However, the Alesina et al. method captures 
important elements of the information covered by all other studies, hence the rationale for adopting it.  
The Alesina et al. method consists of ranking the answers to 10 questions, presented in Appendix 
A. The rankings of answers are reflected in the scores listed in the table, with higher scores reflecting 
greater opportunity for fiscal discipline.17 Questions 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8 pertain to issues regarding "borrowing 
constraint." The first three questions ask about the existence of constitutional constraints on the deficit, the 
                                                     
17 In Alesina et al. (1999), the scores range from 0 to 10.  I have scaled the range from 0 to 1. The purpose of 
rescaling is to avoid the regression coefficients that are very small and require many digits after the decimal point. 
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importance of a macroeconomic plan as a constraint to the budget process, and the existence of borrowing 
constraints on the central government. Questions 7 and 8 relate to whether the deficit constraints are 
binding ex ante or ex post. The average of the scores for these five questions yields a "borrowing constraint 
sub-index." Questions 4, 5 and 6 highlight "agenda setting" powers of the finance minister (or whichever 
office is responsible for the overall budget design). Question 4 deals with the role of the finance minister 
within the government in the budget design stage. Questions 5 and 6 capture the relative position of the 
government vis-à-vis the legislature in the approval stage. The average score for these three questions forms 
the "agenda setting sub-index." Questions 9 and 10 are concerned with whether or not the budget of the 
central government can be subverted and "contaminated" by the borrowing practices of other public 
agencies. The less the central government has control, and the more other agencies can influence the budget 
balance, the less meaningful is the government's budget plan.  The average of the scores for these two 
questions yields an "ex post control sub-index." Finally, to construct an overall "fiscal discipline index," we 
calculate the average of the three sub-indices. Note that all these indices range from 0 to 1, with higher 
values representing greater ability to ensure discipline.  
The index of fiscal discipline thus constructed yields data for 69 countries.18 For most countries, 
the assessment of fiscal institutions is available for only one point in time. We use such observations for all 
years in our panel data because fiscal institutions do not change very often.   
3.3.3 Additional Control Variables 
A number of other variables have been examined in the empirical studies of sovereign spreads. In 
the empirical work presented here, we use a set of such variables to control for effects that are not (or should 
not) be captured by the variables representing Fiscal Outcomes and Budget Institution Index. This set 
consists of Foreign Reserves, External Debts, CPI, and Law and Order Index.   
Considering that credit spreads indicate the default risk of a country on its foreign currency bonds, 
we add several variables that possibly affect the ability to honor its outstanding debt denominated in 
foreign currencies. In this sense, both Foreign Reserves as share of GDP and External Debt as share of 
                                                     
18 These countries are: Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Korea, Rep., Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, 
United Kingdom, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yemen. 
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GDP are added as explanatory variables. Reserves to GDP ratio is expected to be negatively correlated to 
the risk premia as higher international reserves reflect a stronger ability to service debt or absorb a 
negative external shock (Baldacci and Kumar, 2010). On the other hand, we would expect the coefficient 
on External Debt to GDP ratio to be positive because the increase in external debt makes a country more 
vulnerable to sudden external shocks. International Reserve and external debt data for each country are 
taken from World Development Indicator (WDI).  
Macroeconomic situation factors such as GDP growth rate and inflation may also be possible 
determinants of credit spreads. A high rate of inflation may indicate structural problems in the 
government’s finances. When a government appears unable or unwilling to pay for current budgetary 
expenses through taxes or debt issuance, it must resort to seigniorage benefits by printing money, which 
leads to persistent inflation in the economy. Furthermore, public dissatisfaction with inflation may in turn 
lead to political instability (Cantor and Packer, 1996). Therefore, one may expect to find that the credit 
spreads increase with higher inflation. We obtain the country’s annual inflation rate data measured by CPI 
from WDI. We also include the per capita income and GDP growth rate because they may possibly 
increase the country’s ability to honor debt; but those GDP related variables turn out to be insignificantly 
related to yields in our regressions.   
As a socio-political variable that may affect the country’s ability to repay debt, we consider the 
Law and Order Index available from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset (see Knack and 
Keefer, 1995). This index measures the country’s strength and impartiality of the legal system and popular 
observance of the law. This index ranges between 0 and 6, with higher scores indicating lower risks. Thus, 
a country can enjoy a high rating if it has a prudent judicial system, but can have a low rating if the law is 
routinely ignored without effective sanctions (for example, widespread illegal strikes). Our hypothesis is 
that the Law and Order Index is negatively related to spreads because the governments with stronger 
enforceability of contracts are more likely to fulfill its previous obligations including debt. 
As already seen in Figure 3.1, there is a clear sign that global financial markets influence the 
emerging market bond spreads. Global factors such as investor’s risk appetite and global liquidity have 
been pointed out as important determinants of credit spreads (Dungey et al., 2001, González‐Rozada and 
Yeyati, 2008). To control for the evolution of international financial markets, we add a year fixed effect 
into the regression.  Indeed, many year dummies turn out to be significant in explaining the fluctuation 
of emerging market credit spreads.  
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There may be many other possible determinants of credit spreads. Some such variables have been 
used in the empirical literature, though the theoretical foundations for experiments have not been 
developed. I also experimented with several indicators of this type. However, no significant result emerged 
and therefore, I will not dwell on them in the rest of this study.  
Demographic composition may determine the level of credit spreads. Countries with faster 
population aging may face stronger spending pressures over the medium term, limiting the space for fiscal 
adjustments and finally increasing the default risk of countries. Therefore, aging may be positively 
correlated to credit spreads (Baldacci and Kumar, 2010). As a measure of aging, we use the share of 
population above 65 years of age out of total population obtained from WDI. 
The Database of Political Institutions (DBPI) consists of various data and ranks on political and 
bureaucratic characteristics of most countries in the world. District magnitude and government orientation 
index are from this dataset. District magnitude is the average number of representatives elected per 
electoral district. If the legislature is composed of lower and upper houses, the measure is the average of the 
two houses weighted by the numbers of each house's seats. In case no competitive election for the 
legislature exists, we give the value of zero to this variable. It is because the information we want to obtain 
from district magnitude is the probability of one-party majority government. As previously discussed, this 
probability gets higher as district magnitude decreases. Since one-party majority government is always 
guaranteed in case no competitive election exists, we give a number less than one for the completeness of 
our dataset. Government orientation has a value of 1 if the chief executive is from a conservative or 
right-wing party, and a value of -1 if from a liberal or left-wing party. For the definitions of conservative 
and liberal party, we use the ones given by DBPI. The value of zero is given for a centrist or if no specific 
information is available from DBPI.  
We also acquire plurality system dummy, margin of majority, legislative and executive indices of 
electoral competitiveness from DBPI. Plurality system dummy has a value of 1 if legislators are elected by a 
winner-take-all or first-past-the-post rule, as opposed to the system where parties get seats based on the 
percentage of votes they receive in the election (proportional representation system). In case both a plurality 
system and proportional representative system are used, we set plurality system dummy as one if the 
majority or all of the lower house seats are determined by a plurality system. Since this dummy variable 
gives similar information that district magnitude does, either one of these two variables is used in actual 
regressions. Margin of majority measures the degree of the ruling party's control in the legislature. It is 
defined as the fraction of seats in the legislature occupied by the ruling party. Finally, legislative and 
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executive indices of electoral competitiveness measure how competitive the legislative or executive 
elections are. Both indices have values from 1 to 7. If the election is more competitive or more democratic, 
they have higher values. For example, legislative index of electoral competitiveness is 7 if multiple parties 
won seats in the legislative election and neither of the parties won more than 75% of the seats.  
From the Polity IV database, we obtain democracy score that ranges from zero to 10. A high score 
implies that the country has more democratic polity. By including this variable, it takes account of the direct 
roles democracy may play in facilitating or impeding fiscal discipline. 
We tried bureaucratic quality, corruption, contract reliability, and government stability variables 
provided by ICRG to test the significance of the political and bureaucratic characteristics of a country. The 
scores are compiled by a survey method that experts on each country's characteristics are involved in. The 
indices range from 0 to 6 or 10, and higher scores indicate better institutions.  
 
3.4 Empirical Analysis 
To test empirically, we regress with both country fixed effects and time fixed effect. As seen in 
Figure 3.1, there exist strong global trends in emerging market spreads. It suggests that time fixed effects 
need to be added to control for any time varying biases that are common across all countries. We examine 
the role of fiscal institutions by interaction terms. In other words, we investigate how the interactions of 
institutions with public debts affect the credit spreads. The structure of the model is the following:  
lnܧܯܤܫ௜௧ ൌ ߚ௢ሺ߬ሻܦܾ݁ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚଵሺ߬ሻܦܾ݁ݐ௜௧ ൈ ܨ௜ ൅ ௜ܺ௧ᇱ ∙ ߚଵሺ߬ሻ ൅ ௜ሺ߬ሻ ൅ ߜ௧ሺ߬ሻ ൅ ߝ௜௧ሺ߬ሻ 
where lnEMBIit is the log of EMBI index of country i in year t, s are parameters at	߬th percentile, Debtit is 
the log of government debt as a percentage of GDP,  fi is the measure for fiscal discipline index of 
country i and ranges between 0 and 1. ௜ܺ௧ᇱ  is a set of possible determinants of credit spreads: log of 
International Reserve  and log of External debt as a percentage of GDP, Law and Order Index, and log 
of CPI are included in the regression. ௜ሺ߬ሻ is the individual fixed effect of country i and ߜ௧ሺ߬ሻ is the 
time fixed effect in year t.  εit is the error term and we employ bootstrapping standard error for 
calculating the standard errors of estimates.  We use one lag for explanatory variables to avoid possible 
endogeneity problems.  
The econometric method that we use for the estimation is a quantile regression with fixed effects 
for the panel dataset (Koenker, 2004). Quantile regression has several advantages in analyzing the 
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determinants of Credit spreads. It is a statistical technique intended to estimate and conduct inference about 
conditional median or other percentiles of the response variable, while classical linear regression methods 
are based on minimizing sums of squared residuals. Owing to this nature of quantile regression, we can 
investigate how explanatory variables differently influence the risk premia among different regions. For 
example, it is possible to estimate whether Debt to GDP alters spreads of a country with a high level of 
credit spreads in the same way that a country with low level of credit spreads is affected. It turns out to be a 
huge advantage, considering that the classical least squares method assumes that covariate effects shift the 
entire distribution by a fixed amount in all regions.   
Another advantage is that the Quantile regression estimates are more robust against outliers in the 
response measurements than ordinary least squares regression. Some EMBI observations have large values 
and the least squares regression estimates can be heavily affected by the outliers once they are included. 
Dropping those observations, however, is not a proper way because they may reflect the country specific 
issues at that time. Finally, Quantile regression can compromise the outlier problem because it cares about 
the rank of the observation, not the values of the observation itself, so we can add the outliers into our 
regression with less concern about robustness issues. A bootstrapping method has been applied to calculate 
standard errors. Since the introduction of a large number of fixed effects can inflate the variability of 
estimates of other covariate effects, these individual effects have been penalized by shrinking toward zero, 
which have been proposed by Koenker (2004)19. 
 
We ran regressions both with and without the interaction of debt with the fiscal institution 
variable and the results are plotted in Figure 3.3. Regression (1) in Figure 3.3 does not include the 
interaction term shows the effect of an increase in debt on spreads when the fiscal institution of a country 
is neglected. Regression (2), however, includes the interaction between debt to GDP ratio and budget 
institution and enables us to test the significance of the budget institution. We used the log value of 
explanatory variables in both regressions and 21 countries are included in the regressions20. Again, Figure 
3.3 presents the graphs of estimated coefficients in each percentile. Each plot depicts one coefficient in the 
quantile regression model while the shaded grey area depicts a 95% confidence interval. The dotted line 
implies a 90% confidence interval.  
                                                     
19 For statistical analysis of quantiles regression for panel data, R package “rqpd” has been employed. 
20 24 countries are in our sample when we run regression without interaction terms. But in the regression outcomes 
presented, we only include the 21 countries to keep the same country list both in regression with and without 
interaction terms. The regression results do not change when we include 3 other countries (South Africa, Ukraine, 
and Vietnam) that do not have a fiscal discipline index.  
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First consider how public debts affect the credit spreads. The regression shows that increases in 
Debt to GDP ratio significantly widens credit spreads for all percentiles and the coefficients of debt to 
GDP steadily increase as regression moves to the upper tails of the quantile. Note that the upper percentile 
such as τ =.9 of the distribution indicates the situation that a country faces high yield spreads. This finding 
suggests that investors penalize the deterioration of a country’s fiscal position by raising borrowing cost. 
Furthermore, investors are more sensitive to increases in debt when this country has already shown the 
symptoms of economic troubles and repayment problems such as high spreads. 
As expected, the interaction of Debt to GDP with fiscal discipline has a significant negative sign 
for all percentiles. Furthermore, the interaction term has a more positive effect on spreads, i.e., narrowing 
the spreads, in the upper tail than in the lower tail. For example in Regression (2) in Figure 3.3, the 
coefficient of the interaction term is -4.03664 at the .25 percentile but it becomes -5.51249 at the .75 
percentile and -6.35972 at the .90 percentile.  It implies that better fiscal institutions tend to mitigate the 
widening of credit spreads caused by increases in debt; this positive effect is larger when the country’s 
spreads are already widened. It is possible because the market participants perceive that country will 
maintain fiscal soundness in the long run, although its public debt increases in the short run even under 
severe negative shock. Therefore, the risk premia of a country with better fiscal institutions does not 
increase as badly as the country with weak fiscal institutions.  
Perhaps surprisingly, the widening of credit spreads caused by changes in debt can be fully offset 
by strong fiscal discipline if a country has a perfect (in the sense of our measurement) fiscal institution. 
The coefficients of the interaction terms are very close or slightly bigger than the coefficients of debt to 
GDP. Considering that the measure of fiscal discipline index ranges from 0 and 1, the interaction term has 
the exact same values as debt to GDP if the fiscal discipline index is 1 and it shrinks as the country’s 
fiscal discipline has a lower score that is close to 0. Therefore, the adverse effect of raising debt on 
spreads is much smaller if a country has a strong discipline. For example, the coefficients of debt to GDP 
and interaction term are 4.2378 and -4.5914 respectively at the 50th percentile of Regression (2). It 
indicates that a one unit increase of log of debt to GDP ratio makes the median value of log of EMBI go 
up by 4.2378, while the interaction term makes this value decrease by -4.5914 when the budget index is 1.  
Now suppose that the country’s fiscal discipline index is 0.338, which is the lowest score in our 
sample. Then the net effect of a one unit increase in log of debt to GDP on the log of EMBI is 4.6267. 
However, the net effect stays only at 0.6366 if a country’s fiscal discipline index is 0.806, which is the 
highest score in our sample. Comparing the magnitude of coefficients of log of debt to GDP from the 
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regression without and with the interaction term also supports our hypothesis. The coefficients of log of 
debt to GDP ratio from the regression without the interaction term are obviously smaller than the ones 
from the regression with interaction. For example, at the 50th percentile, the coefficient of log of debt to 
GDP in Regression (1) is 1.7468 and the coefficient in Regression (2) is 4.238, which includes interaction 
between debt to GDP and fiscal institution. It is because the coefficient in Regression (1) reflects the net 
effect of changes in debt on spreads while the coefficient of debt to GDP in Regression (2) explains the 
possible increases of spreads before the interaction of debt to GDP with fiscal discipline decreases the 
magnitude of widening spreads. 
Both Foreign reserve and external debt have the expected correlation with spreads. Foreign 
Reserve to GDP ratio, which provides insulation against external shock, is negatively related to credit 
spreads with statistical significance. Foreign Reserve to GDP has a quite uniform effect on spreads over 
the whole range of the distribution. i.e., the size of coefficients is quite stable in all quantiles. It implies 
that any accumulation of foreign reserves decreases the spreads linearly with the same magnitude in all 
regions. External debt to GDP ratio, which indicates the vulnerability of a country to external shocks, is 
positively correlated with credit spreads.  
The regressions show that the stronger socio-political institutional feature measured by the Law 
and Order Index reduces the borrowing cost of a country and this positive effect is stable across all the 
percentiles. One notch higher of the indicator decreases the log of EMBI by about -0.1 throughout the 
distribution in Regression (2). Macroeconomic instability measured by CPI has a deleterious effect on the 
borrowing cost of a country. If a country suffers from higher inflation, it may suggest the structural 
problem of the government’s finances and investors are willing to charge higher interest rates. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This study investigates the role of fiscal discipline on credit spreads in emerging market countries. 
The analysis takes into account country-specific factors and global trends for a panel of 21 emerging 
market economies. The key finding is that fiscal institutions are a significant determinant of risk premia. 
We find that the increases in public debt lead to widening of the spreads but it becomes less important 
when a country has better fiscal institutions. In other words, better fiscal institutions tend to mitigate the 
widening of credit spread from increases in debt.  
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Furthermore, the quantile regression method which was adopted for the analysis helps to estimate 
the different influence of fiscal discipline on spreads along the distribution of credit spreads. It turns out 
that the fiscal institutions have strong forces to decrease the credit spreads as regression moves to the 
upper tails of distribution, which refers to the higher credit spread regions. It is possible because the 
market participants consider the role of fiscal institutions when pricing the risk premia of sovereign bonds. 
Investors perceive that the country will be more likely to maintain fiscal prudence in the long run in spite 
of short run deterioration in the fiscal position if it has better fiscal institutions.  
An interesting outcome of this study is that the widening of spreads can be completely offset by 
good fiscal discipline in a country. It implies that the negative impact of borrowing more money from 
financial markets on bond yield spreads will be negligible if a country has good fiscal institutions. It can 
explain why some countries face much higher yield spreads while another country can borrow money at 
about the same price.  
Last, other than public debt and budget institutions, it is worth noting that the socio-political 
characteristics of a country such as Contract Reliability and observance of Law and Order also play 
important roles in determining the level of sovereign bonds yield spreads. Better fiscal and political 
characteristics decrease the possible default risk of a country and lead to lower credit spreads. In practice, 
we can say that improving institutional characteristics and becoming more reliable in the financial 
markets helps a country to borrow money at a lower interest rate. 
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Chapter 3  Figures 
Figure 3.1 Trends in Emerging Market Sovereign Bond Spread 
  
Source: Global Financial Data and Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE)  
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Figure 3.2 EMBI and Public Debt 
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Figure 3.2 (cont.) 
 
   
  
  
Source: Global Financial Data and World Economic Outlook  
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Figure 3.3 Quantile Regression Plots 
 
 
(1) Regression  without the Interaction 
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Figure 3.3 (cont.) 
 
 
 
(1)   Regression  without the Interaction 
between Debt-GDP and Budget 
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(2)  Regression  with the Interaction 
between Debt-GDP and Budget 
Institutions 
Fi
gu
re
 3
.3
.d
. L
ag
ge
d 
L
og
 o
f 
 
E
xt
er
na
l D
eb
t-
G
D
P 
R
at
io
 
Fi
gu
re
 3
.3
.e
. L
ag
ge
d 
L
aw
 a
nd
 
O
rd
er
 
Fi
gu
re
 3
.3
.f.
 L
ag
ge
d 
L
og
 o
f 
In
fla
tio
n 
R
at
e 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
n
t
Quantiles
-1
0
1
2
3
4
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
n
t
Quantiles
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
n
t
Quantiles
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
n
t
Quantiles
-1
0
1
2
3
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
n
t
Quantiles
-1
0
1
2
3
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
n
t
Quantiles
87 
 
References 
 
Akitoby, B. and T. Stratmann. 2008. “Fiscal Policy and Financial Markets,” Economic Journal 111: 
1971–85. 
Akitoby, Bernardin, and Thomas Stratmann. 2010. "The value of institutions for financial markets: 
evidence from emerging markets." Review of World Economics 146.4: 781-797. 
Alesina, Alberto, Ricardo Hausmann, Rudolf Hommes, and Ernesto Stein. 1999. “Budget Institutions and 
Fiscal Performance in Latin America”, Journal of Development Economics, 59: 253-273. 
Alesina, Alberto, Nouriel Roubini, and Gerald D. Cohen. 1997. Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press.  
Alesina, Alberto, Tabellini, Guido. 1990. A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt. 
Review of Economic Studies, 57: 403–414. 
Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti. 1994. “The political economy of budget deficits”, No. w4637. 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti. 1999. "Budget Deficits and Budget Procedures," in Poterba and von 
Hagen: 13-57. 
Arellano, Cristina. 2008. "Default risk and income fluctuations in emerging economies." The American 
Economic Review: 690-712. 
Banks, Arthur S. 2011, Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, 1815-2011. 
Baldacci, Emanuele, and Manmohan Kumar. 2010. "Fiscal deficits, public debt, and sovereign bond 
yields." IMF Working Papers: 1-28. 
Baldacci, Emanuele, Sanjeev Gupta, and Amine Mati. 2011. "Political and fiscal risk determinants of 
sovereign spreads in emerging markets", Review of Development Economics 15.2: 251-263. 
Barro, Robert J., 1979, “On the Determination of the Public Debt”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 87: 
940-971 
Beck, Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh. 1999. New tools and new 
tests in comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions, Computer file, 
Compiled by Development Research Group, World Bank. 
Bernoth, Kerstin and Wolff, Guntram B. 2008. “Fooling the market? Creative Accounting, Fiscal 
Transparency and Sovereign Risk Premia”, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Volume 55: 
465–487 
Bernoth, Kerstin, Jürgen Von Hagen, and Ludger Schuknecht. 2012. "Sovereign risk premiums in the 
European government bond market." Journal of International Money and Finance 31, no. 5: 
975-995 
88 
 
Bird, Graham, and Alistair Milne. 2003. "Debt Relief for Low Income Countries: Is it Effective and 
Efficient?" The World Economy, 26.1: 43-60. 
Bird, Graham. 2001. "IMF Programs: Do They Work? Can They Be Made to Work Better?" World 
Development, 29.11: 1849-1865. 
Cantor, Richard, and Frank Packer. 1996. "Determinants and impact of sovereign credit ratings." 
Economic Policy Review 2.2.  
Canning, David, and Peter Pedroni. 1999. "Infrastructure and Long Run Economic Growth" Paper 
presented at the 1999 Econometric Society Summer Meeting, Madison, Wisconsin.  
Campos, Camila FS, Dany Jaimovich, and Ugo Panizza. 2006. "The unexplained part of public debt." 
Emerging Markets Review, 7.3: 228-243. 
Ciocchini, Francisco, Erik Durbin, and David TC Ng. 2003. "Does corruption increase emerging market 
bond spreads?", Journal of Economics and Business 55.5: 503-528. 
Coes, Donald V. 1995. “Macroeconomic Crises, Policies, and Growth in Brazil, 1964-90”. Washington, 
DC: The World Bank. 
Cole, Harold L., and Timothy J. Kehoe. 1996. "A self-fulfilling model of Mexico's 1994–1995 debt 
crisis.", Journal of international Economics, 41.3: 309-330. 
Cole, Harold L.  and Kehoe, Timothy J., 2000, “Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises”, The Review of Economic 
Studies, Vol. 67: 91-116 
Davidson, Russel, and James G. MacKinnon. 1993. Estimation and Inference in Econometrics, New York, 
Oxford University Press. 
Eaton, Jonathan, and Mark Gersovitz. 1981. "Debt with potential repudiation: Theoretical and empirical 
analysis.", The Review of Economic Studies, 48.2: 289-309. 
Easterly, William. 1999. "When is Fiscal Adjustment an Illusion?" Economic Policy, 14: 55-86. 
Edwards, Sabastian. 1984. “LDC's Foreign Borrowing and Default Risk: An Empirical Investigation.”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 74, No. 4: 726-734. 
Eichengreen, B. and A. Mody. 1998. “What Explains Changing Spreads on Emerging Market Debt: 
Fundamentals or Market Sentiment”, National Bureau of Economic Research working paper 
series 6408. 
English, William B. 1996. "Understanding the costs of sovereign default: American state debts in the 
1840's.", The American Economic Review: 259-275. 
Esfahani, Hadi Salehi. 2001. "What Can We Learn from Budget Institutions Details?" Manuscript, 
Department of Economics, University of Illinois. 
Gleich, Holger. 2003. "Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Central and Eastern Europe," 
European Central Bank Working Paper No. 215. 
89 
 
González‐Rozada, Martín, and Eduardo Levy Yeyati. 2008. "Global factors and emerging market 
spreads", The Economic Journal 118.533: 1917-1936. 
Gwartney, James and Robert Lawson with Herbert Grubel, Jakob de Haan, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and Eelco 
Zandberg (2009). Economic Freedom of the World: 2009 Annual Report. Vancouver, BC: The 
Fraser Institute. Data retrieved from www.freetheworld.com. 
Hallerberg, Mark, Rolf Strauch, and Jürgen von Hagen. 2001. The Use and Effectiveness of Budgetary 
Rules and Norms in EU Member States, Report Prepared for the Dutch Ministry of Finance by the 
Institute of European Integration Studies. 
Hallerberg, Mark, and Guntram B. Wolff. 2008. "Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk 
premia in EMU." Public Choice 136.3: 379-396. 
Holger Gleich. 2003. “Budget institutions and fiscal performance in central and eastern European 
countries”, European central bank working paper no. 215 
Jaggers, Keith, and Ted Robert Gurr. 2002. Polity IV: Regime Type and Political Authority, 1800-2000, 
Computer file, Boulder, CO. 
Joulfaian, David, and Michael L. Marlow. 1991. "The Relationship Between On-Budget and Off-Budget 
Government," Economic Letters, 35: 307-310. 
Kharas, Homi, and Deepak Mishra. 2001. "Fiscal policy, hidden deficits, and currency crises" World Bank 
Economists’ Forum. Vol. 1.  
Kim, Yong Kyun. 2008. "Democracy, Transparency, and the Confidence Crisis in International Credit 
Markets." Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill  
Knack, Stephen, and Philip Keefer. 1995. “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests 
Using Alternative Institutional Measures", Economics and Politics, 7.3: 207-227. 
Koenker, Roger. 2004. "Quantile regression for longitudinal data." Journal of Multivariate Analysis 91.1: 
74-89. 
Laeven, Luc, and Fabián Valencia. 2012. "Systemic Banking Crises Database: An Update", International 
Monetary Fund 
Lao-Araya, Kanokpan. 1998. "Budget Processes in Selected Asian Countries," in K. Lao-Araya, The Fiscal 
Constitution of a Developing Country: The Case of Thailand, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. 
Lee, Kevin, M. Hashem Pesaran, and Ron Smith. 1997. "Growth and Convergence in a Multicountry 
Empirical Stochastic Solow Model,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 12: 357-392. 
Mark Hallerberg, Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget 
Deficits in the European Union, University of Chicago Press 
Pedroni, Peter. 1999. "Critical Values for Cointegration Tests in Heterogeneous Panels with Multiple 
Regressors," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 61.S1: 653-670. 
90 
 
Persson, Torsten, and Lars E.O. Svensson. 1989. "Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: 
Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104: 325–345. 
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Poterba, James M., and Jürgen von Hagen (eds.). 1999. Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Pouzo, Demian, 2009. "Optimal taxation with endogenous default under incomplete markets." Manuscript, 
New York University. 
Przeworski, Adam, and James R. Vreeland. 2000. "The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth," 
Journal of Development Economics, 62: 385–421. 
Prud'homme, Remy. 1995. "On the Dangers of Decentralization." The World Bank Research Observer, 4: 
201-210. 
Rosendorff, B. Peter and James Raymond Vreeland. 2006. “Democracy and Data Dissemination: The 
Effect of Political Regime on Transparency.” Presented at the First Annual International Political 
Economy Society Conference, Princeton University. 
Roubini, Nouriel and Jeffrey D. Sachs. 1989. "Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in 
the Industrial Democracies," European Economic Review, 33: 903-938. 
Shah, Anwar. 1998. "Fiscal Federalism and Macroeconomic Governance: For Better or For Worse?" World 
Bank Working Paper. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Tanzi, Vito. 1996. Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization: A Review of Some Efficiency and 
macroeconomic Aspects," Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, 1995. 
Washington, DC: The World Bank: 295-316. 
Velasco, Andres. 1999. "A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms," in Poterba 
and von Hagen. 
von Hagen, Jürgen. 2002. “Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Institutions, and Fiscal Performance”, The Economic and 
Social Review, No. 3: 263-284  
von Hagen, Jürgen and Wolff, Guntram B. 2006. “What do deficits tell us about debt? Empirical evidence 
on creative accounting with fiscal rules in the EU”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 30 , 3259–3279 
Weber, Anke. 2012. “Stock-Flow Adjustments and Fiscal Transparency: A Cross-Country Comparison” 
(PDF Download). International Monetary Fund 
Weingast, Barry R., Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen. 1981. "The Political Economy of 
Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political 
Economy, 89.4: 642-664. 
Ul Haque, Nadeem, Nelson Mark, and Donald Mathieson. 1996. "The economic content of indicators of 
developing country creditworthiness.", IMF Working Paper, Vol: 1-46. 
  
91 
 
Appendix A. Assessment of Budget Institutions: Alesina et al (1999) Method 
Institutional Arrangement Score Institutional Arrangement Score 
1. What constitutional constraints are there on the fiscal 
deficit?    
7. Can the budget be modified after Congress 
approval?    
No restrictions  0.00 On Government's or Congress' initiative   0.00 
Budget should include proper financing for deficit  
0.50 
On government's initiative without 
congressional approval   0.50 
Deficits are not allowed  1.00 On government's initiative with congressional approval   0.75 
  No   1.00 
2. Is there a legal requirement for the approval of a macro 
program to precede the presentation of the budget to 
Congress? How important is this requirement in practice?   
 
8. Is the government legally empowered to cut 
spending after the budget has been approved?    
Not important or not required   0.00 No   0.00 
Relatively important   0.50 At government's discretion on any item   0.67 
Very important   1.00 At government's discretion for non-earmarked expenditures   0.67 
  Only when revenues are lower than projected   1.00 
3. What kind of borrowing constraints are there on the 
government?    
9. Does the central government typically assume 
debt originally contracted by other public agencies? 
Under what circumstances?    
 
Govt. borrows if shortfall   0.00 Including non-guaranteed debt   0.00 
Congress approves each borrowing operation   0.33 Frequently   0.33 
Ceiling set by the government   0.67 Occasionally   0.67 
Ceiling set by Congress   1.00 Only on guaranteed debt   0.75 
  Exceptionally   1.00 
4. Is the authority of the Minister of Finance greater than that 
of the spending ministers on budgetary issues?    
10. Can these agencies borrow autonomously?    
No 0.00 State and local governments    
Somewhat greater   0.50 Yes, without restrictions   0.00 
Yes, considerably greater   1.00 With local legislative approval   0.125 
5: Restrictions on the content of amendments to the budget 
by Congress: Congress can only pass amendments...    
With central government approval   0.250 
with no restrictions   0.00 With Congress approval   0.375 
that do not increase spending   0.2.5 No   0.50 
that do not increase the deficit   0.50  Public enterprises    
that do not increase the deficit or spending without 
government approval   0.75 
Yes, without restrictions   0.00 
that do not increase deficit or spending   0.10 With central government approval   0.20 
6: What happens if Congress rejects the budget, or does not 
approve it within the constitutionally set time frame?    
With Congress approval   
0.30 
The government submits a new budget or previous 
year's budget is enacted by 12ths  0.20 
No 0.50 
The government submits a new budget   0.40   
The government resigns   0.50   
The previous year's budget is enacted   0.60   
No funds may be expended   0.80   
The budget proposed by government is enacted   1.00   
 
